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ABSTRACT 
 As the U.S. Navy continues the development of the Medium Displacement 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MDUSV), a doctrinal shift of the surface fleet necessitates 
examining potential manned-unmanned teaming mission sets within the construct of 
Distributed Maritime Operations. Utilizing systems engineering for architectural 
development, discrete-event simulation, and analysis, this capstone report evaluates 
MDUSV performance of an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting 
mission in support of a 2–3 ship Adaptive Force Package’s over-the-horizon surface 
strike. The results indicate that there is a large benefit associated with utilizing passive 
sensors on MDUSVs in lieu of an active radar and that the magnitude of this benefit 
increases when lofting the passive sensors on towed airborne arrays. Extensions to 
MDUSV communications and operating ranges, in some configurations, led to detections 
of the enemy further from friendly manned vessels, but decreased the survivability and 
lethality of the main body when these ranges eclipsed the lowest ranged surface-strike 
weapons in the inventory. Additionally, while overall effectiveness increased with an 
offensive jammer on MDUSV, defensive countermeasures provided no discernable 
improvement to the Adaptive Force Package’s performance. 
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In 2010, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) began work 
on the Anti-submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV). The Office 
of Naval research partnered with DARPA on the ACTUV project in 2014, and the Medium 
Displacement Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MDUSV) Sea Hunter was christened in 2016. 
This report strives to demonstrate that the MDUSV can contribute to a 2016 concept 
documented in Surface Forces Strategy. In it, Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden introduced 
the Distributed Lethality (DL): the U.S. could better establish sea control where and when 
required through the combination of “increasing the offensive and defensive capability of 
individual warships” and operating these warships in geographically displaced groups 
called “Adaptive Force Packages” (AFP). DL aims to disrupt enemy targeting through 
dispersion and ambiguity (Rowden 2016). The Navy later grew the concepts of DL into 
the total system approach of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). In 2018, the Chief 
of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson, designated DMO maturation as one of the main 
focus areas to strengthen “naval power at and from the sea” (Richardson 2018). 
To support research, the sponsor-submitted topic may broadly be characterized as 
investigating how MDUSV could be employed to increase AFP mission success in a DMO 
environment. The capstone team utilized an analysis approach detailed in The Naval 
Postgraduate School's Department of Systems Engineering Approach to Mission 
Engineering Education through Capstone Projects (Van Bossuyt et al. 2019). The effort 
resulted in mission-oriented systems engineering which addresses system definition, 
system modeling, and system analysis functions. A revised problem statement directed 
research into MDUSVs supporting AFPs in an over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T) 
surface-to-surface strike. 
Within this potential mission area, four project objectives were explored. These 
included researching communications methods required to support OTH-T operations of 
MDUSV, evaluating the benefits of different sensor types for detection and targeting, 
examining MDUSV electronic attack capabilities, and understanding the relationship 
between MDUSV defensive countermeasures and AFP effectiveness.  
xx 
Outside of seaworthiness and logistical concerns, operational analysis yielded three 
top-level activities: Communicate with the AFP, Perform ISR, and Support Engagement. 
In support of Communicate with the AFP, a scenario pre-condition of unavailable satellite 
communications (SATCOM) was imposed requiring the MDUSV to station within LOS 
ranges to communicate with the AFP. Perform ISR refers to the detection, correlation, and 
tracking of threats. Support Engagement includes the activities of providing fire control 
information to the AFP and performing an electronic attack (EA).  
Operational and functional analysis resulted in the following allocation to a 
MDUSV capable AFP. Communication functionality refers to the exchange of sensor and 
control information. Varied for simulation, this functionality maps to mast-height antenna 
data exchanges, an antenna directly connected to the MDUSVs but elevated by a Towed 
Airborne Lift of Naval Systems (TALONS), or an airborne relay from AFP-launched 
rotorcraft. Sense functionality (find, fix, and track) includes either passive sensing 
functionality (physically mapping to sensors such as electronic support measures [ESM]) 
or active sensing functionality (mapping to surface-search radar). While functional analysis 
indicated that an operational MDUSV could be outfitted with both categories of sensors, 
the simulation permitted only one type per run. Passive sensor functionality also leverages 
TALONS. Sensor lofting was not applied to active sensors due to feasibility concerns. C2 
Functions includes various AFP battle management and engagement control functionality. 
EA is included here as an offensive spectrum jammer on MDUSV. Last, Self-Defense 
referred to various countermeasure functionality implemented on the AFP and MDUSV. 
Of note, no conventional weapon functionality was included with the MDUSV. 
The design of experiments was constructed utilizing the statistical analysis program 
JMP. Inputs including communications range/antenna height, sensor mode, offensive 
jamming, and MDUSV countermeasures were varied across runs. Additionally, the number 
of MDUSVs available to the AFP ranged from 0-10. Three configurations of AFP manned 
vessels were used: one DDG-51 Flight III and two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), two DDG-
51 Flight III and one LCS, and two DDG-51 Flight III without LCS. In addition to publicly 
available defensive capabilities of the vessels, an assortment of future surface-strike 
xxi 
strike weaponry was assigned to each vessel. The Red force was defined as a very capable, 
mixed package of ships, weaponry and sensors. 
A discrete event simulation was developed using the program ExtendSim. The 
simulation implemented the experiment described above. Simulation outputs corresponded 
to measures associated with the functions, operational activities, and project objectives. 
The measures of effectiveness (MOE) covered the entire engagement sequence and 
included First-to-fire, Destroyed Enemy Forces, and Number of Manned AFP Assets 
Destroyed. 
Results concerning communications methods were partially different from what 
was anticipated. It was hypothesized that communication ranges enabled through a MQ-8 
relay allow the MDUSV to push further ahead of the AFP and enable the AFP to strike 
from greater distances. This hypothesis was incorrect when using surface-search radars as 
Red frequently detected and destroyed the MDUSV before Blue achieved a first detection. 
However, when the MDUSV employed ESM the MDUSV enabled Blue to achieve a 
detection and fire before Red. Despite this, extended communication ranges did not largely 
impact the First-to-fire MOE and resulted in higher AFP manned vessel attrition and lower 
Red losses. These counter-hypothesis results are primarily linked to the AFP vessel and 
weapon configuration. While extended communications range functionality may still be 
desirable for MDUSV and AFP, designs and doctrine should balance the benefits of early 
knowledge with the cost of exceeding the ranges of even a portion of the AFP surface-
strike weapon inventory. 
The results for sensor mode variation indicated that operating an underpowered 
radar on the MDUSV led to early MDUSV attrition, whereas the ESM system generally 
allowed Blue to receive an MDUSV generated track before Red detected Blue. This slight 
advantage drastically improved when ESM ranges were extended by elevating the system 
on TALONS. Even without TALONS, passive ESM was a very significant benefit across 
all MOEs; forgoing active radar for ESM led to improved AFP effectiveness. Following 
this, while a feasible MDUSV radar may add value in other missions, the use of it in a 
high-threat environment should be curtailed. Future MDUSVs should include robust ESM 
systems. They reduce the susceptibility of the MDUSV and greatly improve AFP 
xxii 
effectiveness. While more feasibility research is needed, the greatest benefits were realized 
when the sensor was elevated via TALONS. 
Simulation runs that included MDUSV offensive jamming (EA functionality) led 
to improvements in the Destroyed Enemy Forces MOE. This interaction, however, was 
less significant than variation in sensor modes. Additionally, the AFP benefits received 
from the jammer differed depending on the sensor mode: when paired with a radar on the 
MDUSV, offensive jamming was operationally significant. When passive sensors were 
employed, offensive jamming was not operationally significant.  
The final research objective was the contributions of MDUSV defensive 
countermeasures to AFP effectiveness. It was hypothesized that reducing MDUSV 
vulnerability would prevent or delay attrition. No statistically significant improvements to 
the reduction in the number of MDUSVs destroyed were indicated by the results. The 
degradation the countermeasures imposed on Red missiles, however, was not varied in the 
simulation; it is likely that a more capable countermeasure would show a statistically 
significant improvement to the AFP Survivability MOE. 
While the conclusions of this capstone provide informed interpretations of the 
results, it was necessary throughout the research to make broad assumptions and feasibility 
decisions to scope the solution space into a framework that could be reasonably simulated. 
Future work areas that are relevant to this capstone but were not researched in it include 
EMCON policy execution and manned-unmanned teaming, SATCOM utilization, 
comprehensive battle management and fire control logic, detailed sensor quality modeling, 
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A. CAPSTONE TASKING 
This capstone report is the result of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) sponsored 
research into Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MDUSV) mission sets 
in Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). Building on the existing body of work 
concerning manned-unmanned teaming and DMO, this report seeks to provide a basic 
understanding of the benefits and tradeoffs of utilizing MDUSVs in an intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR-T) mission to support a manned Adaptive 
Force Package (AFP) over-the-horizon surface strike against a peer adversary in a 2030–
2035 timeframe.  
B. BACKGROUND 
1. MDUSV 
In 2010, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) began work 
on the Anti-submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV), displayed 
in Figure 1, to track enemy submarines. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) partnered 
with DARPA on the ACTUV project in 2014 as the capability development continued. 
Oregon Iron Works (now Vigor Works), under prime contractor Leidos, built Sea Hunter 
and christened it in 2016. As DARPA and ONR continued development on what is to 
become the MDUSV, Sea Hunter tested mine countermeasure packages in August of 2017. 
In February of 2018, DARPA officially transitioned the MDUSV to the ONR to continue 
development (Trevithick 2018). 
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Figure 1.  Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vehicle. Source: 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (2018). 
Further operational success has been found as Sea Hunter became the first 
unmanned vessel to successfully navigate a round trip from San Diego, California, to Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii, and back (Gady 2019). The MDUSV operating parameters are listed in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. MDUSV Operating Parameters. Adapted from 
Jontz (2016).  
Category Parameter 
Displacement ~140 tons (with 40 tons of diesel fuel) 
Propulsion Twin diesel engines 
Top Speed ~27 knots 
Endurance ~70 day mission 
Construction Cost $23 Million 
Daily Operating Cost ~$15,000-$20,000 per day 
 
2. Distributed Maritime Operations 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the U.S. Navy has focused on the projection 
of offensive power to control sea-area access. In an uncontested environment, the U.S. 
Navy shifted focus to the projection of power ashore. The carrier-based operations 
3 
projected offensive capability with the air wings while the remainder of the surface 
combatants focused on the defense of high-value assets against cruise missiles, ballistic 
missiles, and submarines. As peer or near-peer adversaries have emerged some 25 years 
later, the U.S. Navy now finds situations in which the adversary has established an effective 
sea control strategy. As the current U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander, Admiral (ADM) Philip 
Davidson, stated, “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios 
short of war with the United States” (Beech 2018). 
In 2016, Vice ADM Thomas Rowden, commander of Naval Surface Forces, signed 
the Surface Forces Strategy to implement improved U.S. Navy sea control strategies. The 
strategy establishes an objective of creating sea control at the location and time of the U.S. 
Navy’s choosing. In the document, two actions are defined to reach the objective: increase 
unit lethality and employ warships in AFP configurations. These actions represent the 
Distributed Lethality (DL) concept (Rowden 2016). The DL concept provides the U.S. 
Navy with the conceptual ability to establish temporary sea control while causing the 
adversary to shift defenses in response to offensive actions.  
Where DL is focused on the increased lethality of surface ships and the tactical 
configuration into an AFP, DMO seeks to scale the DL concept into a total system 
approach. A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0, provided by the Chief of 
Naval Operations, ADM Richardson, is the first public introduction of DMO. The 
document called for the maturation of the DMO concept and all supporting concepts. 
Additionally, the document calls for a 2020 large-scale exercise and subsequent exercises 
to demonstrate the progress in DMO execution (Richardson 2018).  
C. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
Given that the objective of this project is to conduct an operational analysis of the 
utility of the MDUSV in support of DMO, the report leverages the analysis approach 
detailed in The Naval Postgraduate School's Department of Systems Engineering Approach 
to Mission Engineering Education through Capstone Projects as the basis for the report 
structure. Accordingly, this report is divided into nine chapters and additional appendices 
resulting in a structure that addresses system definition, system modeling, and system 
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analysis functions. The eight chapters described below generally correspond with the NPS 
mission engineering capstone process (Van Bossuyt et al. 2019). 
Chapter II, Literature Review, documents the background information necessary 
for defining the problem and determining project objectives, as well as guiding certain 
decisions for operational and functional analysis and simulation design. Summaries of 
these reports are contained in this section. 
Chapter III, Problem Definition, transforms initial capstone tasking into a specific 
problem statement. The remainder of the report responds to this statement, with emphasis 
provided in areas covered by the project objectives documented in this chapter. 
Chapter IV, Concept of Operations, describes the overarching scenario governing 
operational and functional analysis, as well as simulation design. 
Chapter V, Operational Analysis, examines operational activities of an AFP 
supplemented with MDUSVs bounded by the surface targeting mission and the 
relationships between these activities.  
Chapter VI, Functional Analysis, derives system functionality from the operational 
analysis within the same bounds for the entire AFP. In the conclusion of this chapter, 
measures of performance and effectiveness are listed and are traceable back through 
functional and operational analysis to project objectives. 
Chapter VII, Simulation Design, documents the translation of the preceding 
chapters into a comprehensive simulation. This chapter encompasses the utilization of NPS 
SEED experimental design tools and JMP statistical software for the design of experiments 
(DOE) and the simulation construction within the program ExtendSim. 
Chapter VIII, Results and Analysis, depicts the outputs of simulation runs, 
interprets the nature of the outputs, and ties these results back to previously defined 
measures and project objectives. 
Chapter IX, Conclusions, derives answers and qualifications relating to the problem 
statement and project objectives by way of the simulation analysis and provides 
recommendations for future work. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before developing a problem statement, we conducted a review of references 
pertaining to DMO and USVs to establish a baseline of current knowledge and to provide 
direction and scope for further research within both of these topics.  
In 2015, Johnson et al., a systems engineering analysis capstone team, researched 
enhanced over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T) capabilities in DMO in the 2025 timeframe. 
They compared a variety of platforms that could qualify as “organic” to a surface action 
group (SAG) and extend its surface-to-surface targeting range. While the group examined 
multiple systems in this role, including some unmanned surface vehicles (USV), they 
determined that unmanned aerial vehicles are likely the most beneficial in expanding this 
capability. They considered small USVs but discounted them primarily due to 
contemporary capability gaps (sea state tolerance and range limitations). The MDUSV, Sea 
Hunter, which mostly overcomes these limitations, was not available for inclusion or 
consideration at the time of this capstone. The team also cited line of sight (LOS) 
communication ranges of surface vessels as a potential issue, which persists as a present-
day limitation (Johnson et al. 2015). 
In a 2017 NPS thesis and captured in a 2018 Naval Engineers Journal article, Casola 
examined MDUSV architecture specifically as a surface warfare (SUW) asset (with a 
surface-to-surface attack capability). While the MDUSV could be an effective attack 
platform, he found that hull size and draft imposed limitations on the ordnance carried. 
Concerning Sea Hunter’s present configuration, he highlighted that a lack of survivability 
equipment (countermeasures, air-search radar, close-in weapons systems, et cetera) 
dramatically reduces the survivability of an enemy attack. Casola acknowledged the 
benefits of sending a lower-cost and unmanned vessel into high-risk areas over the risk of 
sending a traditionally manned surface combatant. He recommended further research into 
MDUSV as an OTH-T and early warning platform. Towed Airborne Lift of Naval Systems 
(TALONS) was cited as a system that could possibly be employed by MDUSV and make 
these remote missions possible (Casola 2017; Casola, Beery, and Paulo 2018). Figure 2 is 
Casola’s functional hierarchy for an MDUSV conducting SUW. 
6 
 
Figure 2.  Functional Hierarchy of Surface Warfare for a MDUSV. 
Source: Casola (2017). 
In 2018, Tanalega researched the contribution of sensors packages, emissions 
control, formations of the surface action group, anti-ship cruise missile armament, and 
utilization of the TALONS on an MDUSV to influence a SAG’s ability to overmatch 
enemy forces through the first-to-fire metric. The study aggregated the research to inform 
MDUSV requirements development but warned that requirements creep in the form of 
multiple sensor and weapons platforms could possibly reduce the low-cost benefits of the 
MDUSV platform. Tanalega’s research utilized modeling and simulation to determine that 
SAGs configured only with manned vessels had a low probability of being first-to-fire 
against enemy forces. However, the addition of a TALONS equipped MDUSV extended 
the sensor range of the SAG and increased the first-to-fire likelihood by nearly three times. 
However, Tanalega did point out that the increased effectiveness came at the sacrifice of 
emissions control (EMCON) (Tanalega 2018).  
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In 2018, Popa et al., a systems engineering analysis capstone team, researched the 
effectiveness of potential manned and unmanned systems and tactics for use in DMO 
between 2030 and 2035. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) included survivability of 
friendly and enemy forces and the effectiveness of enemies in the “find sequence” and 
“target sequence” of an engagement. Overall, they determined that various types of 
jamming resulted in the highest effectiveness values for friendly forces; the delays in the 
enemy’s engagement sequence created by jamming allowed more time for friendly forces 
to achieve the first strike. Additionally, unmanned vessels were beneficial by creating 
clutter and directing some enemy salvos away from more valuable units. This benefit is 
somewhat tied to the unmanned platforms spoofing characteristics of these vessels (Popa 
et al. 2018).  
Later in 2018, Winstead, in a systems engineering thesis, evaluated the benefits of 
several USV mission sets in DMO also in the 2030–2035 timeframe. The principal 
missions included intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), air and missile 
(AMD), and SUW. He considered SUW as a ship-to-ship shooter (armed USV) whereas 
ISR likely would include remote targeting capabilities. Applicable mission systems were 
reasonably included within the constraints of a USV and were decoupled from the limited 
equipment currently employed on Sea Hunter. After performing simulations, his analysis 
concluded that the armed variant (SUW) provided little benefit to the Blue force, whereas 
the ISR and AMD variants improved several key measures of effectiveness (notably, 
surviving the enemy force). Overall, Winstead concluded that USVs would likely be 
fiscally and operationally beneficial if employed alongside a manned surface force 
conducting DMO (Winstead 2018). Winstead’s USV functional hierarchy is displayed in 
Figure 3. The beneficial portions summarized above fall under the Perform AMD and 
Perform IO/INT functions. 
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Figure 3.  USV Functional Architecture. Source: Winstead (2018). 
From these theses and capstones, several themes can be extrapolated: within the 
limitations of performed simulations, MDUSV has the potential to increase overall U.S. 
fleet performance while conducting DMO. Munitions on an armed USV, however, are 
significantly limited by vessel characteristics; realistic ordnance and inventories may not 
be hugely beneficial to the overall effectiveness of a force. Separately, the ability to strike 
first (with proper weapons pairing) ultimately improves effectiveness. This ability can be 
improved by adding clutter for the enemy to sort through, conducting jamming operations, 
and extending the sensor range of shooting platforms. 
 
9 
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. INITIAL PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Based on the sponsor-submitted topics and capstone tasking, the initial problem can 
be summarized as:  
• How can MDUSVs be employed in support of an AFP to best add value to 
friendly forces conducting a range of missions in a DMO environment? 
• What current MDUSV capabilities provide substantive impact to mission 
success and what additional system capabilities for follow-on work would 
expand mission success? 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
This capstone’s stakeholders can be characterized in two broad categories: 
stakeholders with needs that have directly influenced the processes and content of this 
research and those whose needs broadly encompass the future of naval warfare and the 
implementation of MDUSV as a SUW asset. Accordingly, Tables 2 and 3 reflect these 
groupings. 
Capstone stakeholders described in Table 2 consist of the project sponsor, Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N96, and the NPS Surface Warfare Chair. The 
Surface Warfare Chair, CAPT Charles Good, was the central avenue for validating our 
research direction as relevant to the stakeholders in Table 3, as well as providing a 
knowledge interface from them. Due to logistical constraints, interactions with OPNAV 
N96 have been limited to the initial tasking, email exchanges, and mid-project interim 
reviews.  
The needs of both of these stakeholders largely mirror project tasking: MDUSV has 
been developed (as ACTUV) for an ASW mission, but may have the potential to advance 
SUW effectiveness by performing specific mission sets. Modeling and simulation support 
a need to provide an initial evaluation of particular mission sets. Further, providing for this 
need is most useful if constrained by DMO (utilizing force structures, distances, and 
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possibly tactics likely to be employed within it). It was identified that performing an OTH-
T mission (with MDUSV providing targeting information to the shooter) was relevant to 
this area of research. Within this specific mission, stakeholders identified AFP composition 
and various future weapon inventories (and thus varying weapons ranges) as variables that 
would add value to the research. Following this, there is also a stakeholder need to explore 
different command and control (C2) methods and data exchange mechanisms (for example, 
LOS data exchanges and relays). It was specifically noted that arming the MDUSV was 
not a principle need in this research, but that may be more useful for follow-on projects 
involving USVs of larger displacement.  
Table 2. Contributing Stakeholders 
Capstone Stakeholder Type Needs 





- Exploration of SUW mission sets for MDUSV 
- Simulation and modeling of MDUSV mission sets 
in DMO 
- Evaluation of MDUSV integration potential in 
DMO 
- Research to support future funding decisions in 
connection to DMO and MDUSV 






- Research into areas relevant to SWE 
- Evaluation of MDUSV performing a realistic 
mission set in DMO 
- Research into MDUSV integrating with AFPs 
(potentially of varying composition) 
- Research into MDUSV supporting surface 
engagements (including ranges/weapon variability) 
- Research into data exchange methods 
- Research building on prior NPS work 





Table 3 includes some stakeholders that were not directly queried by the capstone 
team for this research, but are concerned with an MDUSV employed in SUW. A broad 
evaluation of their needs was still performed to better direct questions to the stakeholders 
in Table 2, and to ensure research and reporting would match the needs of all potential 
audience members. This view of stakeholder needs is more encompassing of the system 
life cycle, and it is a broader look at needs associated with the Department of the Navy 
mission accomplishment.  
Ultimately, combatant commanders or fleet commanders will be the principle 
“users” or temporary owners of an operational MDUSV. Their ultimate concern is naval 
dominance in assigned regions, but balancing this with the availability of risk mitigation 
options and the preservation of future capabilities following system employment. This 
research may show an avenue for supporting these needs with MDUSV in this mission set.  
Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet (SURFOR) will likely be the long-term system 
owner. While out of the scope of this research, they are concerned with the logistical and 
administrative supportability of MDUSV, as well as long-term materiel and personnel 
readiness. Additionally, as the owner of collaborative systems, they need future systems to 
integrate into the existing and future inventory of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense 
(DoD), and international partners.  
Other stakeholders relevant to the system life cycle and mission effectiveness are 
listed for reference. 
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Table 3. Stakeholders and Needs 
System Stakeholder Type Needs for/from Future System(s) 
Senior Science & 
Technology Advisor 
(N9I/N96)  
Research Sponsor  
- Sufficient funding tracks relevant to other 
stakeholders 
- Cost efficiency in accomplishing future 
naval missions  
Combatant and Fleet 
Commanders System Users 
- Naval dominance from peer adversaries in 
contested environments 
- Targeting capabilities paired with future 
weaponry 
- Risk flexibility in threat environments 
- Survivability of assets in various threat 
environments (capability preservation) 
Commander, Naval 








- Integration of existing and future DoD and 
international partner systems 
- Logistical and administrative supportability of 
future systems 
- Deployment cycle readiness 
 
Office of Naval Research  System Developer (Present)  
- Capability direction and funding  
Program Executive 
Office Unmanned and 
Small Combatants (PEO 
USC)  















- Advancement of SUW effectiveness/tactics in 
DMO 
- Integration of system into existing tactical 
methods 
- Operator / collaborative system operator 








C. PROBLEM STATEMENT SCOPE 
With a broad initial need to evaluate MDUSV performing a mission set, clear 
demarcation needed to occur to arrive at a concise problem statement. Discussions with 
NPS faculty stakeholders indicated a desire to explore possible improvements to AFP 
organic targeting capabilities. This aligned with previous NPS work that was discussed 
during the last chapter: a 2015 capstone team eliminated USVs from remote targeting due 
to contemporary capabilities, a 2017 thesis recommended exploring remote targeting with 
MDUSV, and a 2018 thesis concluded MDUSV performing ISR (which heavily overlaps 
with OTH-T) was beneficial to an AFP. Researching MDUSV in this specific mission is 
within the bounds of the initial problem statement, is relevant to stakeholders, and builds 
on previous NPS work. 
D. REVISED PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Surface combatants have limited organic abilities to target enemy surface vessels 
beyond the horizon. Geographically displaced ships and air assets may fill this capability 
gap; however, these may place manned forces in dangerous locations, are of limited 
endurance, may be uniquely detectable by an enemy, and could come with higher financial 
costs than alternatives. When a surface combatant lacks an external asset to provide 
targeting information, it must shrink the distance to the enemy to within its own sensor’s 
range before proceeding with an engagement, nullifying any surplus weapon range.    
While conducting DMO, MDUSV(s) could be deployed to clear threats areas and 
provide OTH-T data to an AFP. An MDUSV successfully accomplishing this may reduce 
human exposure to threats during an engagement sequence and preserve higher-value, 
more capable platforms for future fights. While organic manned or unmanned aircraft could 
perform a similar mission, the extended endurance, differences in detectability, and 
potential for higher simultaneous quantities of MDUSVs all make it a potential alternative. 
This untested mission set for a conceptual platform could keep human lives out of enemy 
weapons range while reducing fiscal and capability-loss risks. The project sponsors need 
research performed to identify and examine an operational concept and architecture for 
MDUSV(s) providing OTH-T data to an AFP. The sponsors need these translated into 
14 
traceable metrics, tested through simulation, analyzed, and reported on with clear 
conclusions and recommendations. 
E. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
This capstone report documents research and analysis constructed to address the 
following project objectives: 
1. Determine the communications methods to best support effective OTH-T 
operation of the MDUSV. 
2. Determine effective sensor types and utilization methods to best support 
detection and engagement in an OTH-T scenario. 
3. Understand enhancements to AFP effectiveness through the utilization of 
electronic attack (EA) capabilities on the MDUSV.  
4. Explore EMCON tactics and implications on detection and engagement 
support to the AFP. 
5. Understand impacts to AFP effectiveness when MDUSV is equipped with 
on-board defensive countermeasures. 
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IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. SCENARIO 
 In order to set the environmental context and threat parameters to be used in 
evaluating MDUSV employment, our team adapted NPS Professor Jeffrey Kline’s 
“Analytical Tasking for Global War of 2030” scenario in which the countries’ Blue 
(friendly) and Red (enemy) are engaged in a fully developed maritime conflict. Figure 4 
depicts a modified overall force distribution for the Second Battle of a Contested Sea in 
2032. 
 
Figure 4.  Global War of 2030 Force Laydown. Adapted from 
Kline (2019). 
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 Blue force submarines have eliminated much of the Red Navy surface forces and 
are currently focusing their efforts on the eastern battlefront. However, intelligence 
indicates the presence of several Red surface vessels in the South Sea of the contested area 
(indicated by the shaded box in Figure 4). Intelligence assesses a low probability of Red 
subsurface forces in the region. This area, shown in Figure 5, currently has one Blue AFP 
operating just north-west of the notional “Blue Controlled Islands.”  
 
Figure 5.  South Sea Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Adapted 
from Kline (2019). 
 Reports suggest that remaining Red surface forces are located north, north-west of 
the AFP. While the present mission of the Red surface vessels is unknown, their most likely 
course of action is seeking to detect and engage Blue surface forces, clearing the area for a 
subsequent assault of the Blue Controlled Islands. Conversely, the Blue AFP is tasked to 
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preemptively defend the islands by localizing, tracking, and destroying the remaining Red 
surface vessels in this region. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
Several assumptions were made concerning this scenario that translated into 
operational analysis, functional analysis, and simulation design: 
• Submarines (both Blue and Red) are operating in other regions (or were 
eliminated by this point in the war). 
• Air assets are limited to platforms attached to the included surface forces 
(shore or long-range support are either out of range or assigned to other 
missions) 
• Beyond the intelligence previously stated, Red and Blue national and 
theater assets are unable to provide further assistance (e.g., visual satellite 
coverage or signals intelligence). 
• Rules of Engagement (ROE) state that either force may fire at any vessel 
not positively identified as friendly. Similarly, each force is aware of 
friendly vessel positions. 
• Commercial vessel operations in this region have been severely disrupted 
by the war. 
• Weaponeering precludes the use of ordnance fired from organic helicopters 
to target the types of vessels included. 
• The logistical infrastructure for MDUSV support exists; due to Sea Hunter 
ranges, replenishment and maintenance is not required during this tasking. 
• The AFP commander retains tactical control (TACON) of attached 
MDUSVs. 
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• Satellite communication links to the MDUSV exist but are jammed or 
otherwise unavailable. Navigation systems (global navigation satellite 
systems or otherwise) are uninhibited. 
• AFP and Red weaponry is more advanced than present-day, top-tier navies 
but are constrained by publicly available information concerning future 
platforms and weapons. 
In the context of the fully developed war, these assumptions set up a surface force 
versus surface force battle, without external support. Classification and identification of 
surface contacts is tactically necessary, but the difficulty is severely reduced by ROE, 
known friendly positions, and the lack of neutral or commercial clutter. Like organic air 
operations, AFP TACON of the MDUSVs allows employment in DMO without dis-located 
command authorities or reliance on external links; the AFP has full surface warfare 
capabilities without dependence on external support. 
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V. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. HIGH-LEVEL OPERATIONAL CONCEPT GRAPHIC 
A high-level operational concept graphic (OV-1) is depicted in Figure 6. It first 
served as a checkpoint on research direction with stakeholders before further analysis, but 
it also exists as a simplified, pictorial explanation of the simulation.  
 
Figure 6.  High-Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) 
In the OV-1, the sensor range of Blue AFP vessels is represented by blue, shaded 
circles. The manned ships are on the left, and the MDUSVs are in the center-right, traveling 
ahead of the AFP main body’s plan of intended movement. The enemy vessels are further 
to the right, just inside the edge of the MDUSV sensor range. The number and pictorial 
displays of vessels are not intended to be taken as a firm type or quantity for later 
simulation. In this OV-1, the Red vessels are initially outside of the manned vessel sensor 
ranges but within the manned vessel weapon ranges. The MDUSVs fill this gap by 
providing their sensor information back to the main body of the AFP, and the main body 
then conducts the strike. While varying formations of MDUSVs was not a principle 
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research point, the vehicles are arranged to provide sensor overlap for mutual support in 
locating Red vessels. 
The yellow bolts signify different MDUSV-AFP communications methods 
available. These include a direct LOS linkage from MDUSV antennas to AFP antennas, a 
lifted MDUSV antenna through the utilization of TALONS, and an airborne relay between 
the vessels. The range variance between these communications methods is not depicted. 
Additionally, satellite communications (SATCOM) is worthy of consideration but was 
excluded from this research, consistent with the scenario. 
B. MDUSV CONTEXT DIAGRAM 
The MDUSV context diagram is provided in Figure 7. It is constructed from the 
perspective of MDUSV and depicts the external systems that interface with it during the 
ISR-T mission. The input/output lines describe data flows, to include data flow direction 
between systems. The MDUSV system is the graphic center and labeled SN.1. 
 
Figure 7.  MDUSV Context Diagram 
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AFP Manned Vessels, EXT.SN.2, represents the surface vessels assigned to the 
AFP configuration. There may be varying numbers of guided missile destroyers (DDG) 
(specifically, DDG-51 Flight III) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) assigned to the AFP, 
but the data flow with the MDUSV remains consistent. The DDG-51 primarily exchanges 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) information with the MDUSV in support of 
the operations. The AFP surface-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons are not depicted in 
the MDUSV context; while the weapons are necessary for the operations, direct interaction 
does not occur with the MDUSV. 
The operator, EXT.SN.3, and environment, EXT.SN.9, are also included. The 
operator provides commands and receives feedback in a bidirectional link with the 
MDUSV. Per the CONOPS, the AFP has TACON of MDUSVs; it is assumed that the 
operators are located within the AFP and ultimately report to the AFP commander. The 
environment provides debris, sea-state, and weather interactions with the MDUSV during 
the course of operations. 
The MH-60R is an air asset assigned to the AFP surface vessels. The asset is labeled 
as EXT.SN.4. There may be multiple MH-60R’s assigned to the AFP, but the interaction 
with the MDUSV at the context level remains the same. While the MH-60R may receive 
LASER designation information from the MDUSV to support weapons engagements, the 
weaponeering assumption previously discussed precludes exercising this approach. More 
critical to the mission of the MDUSV, if the MH-60R is employed, it could act as an 
airborne relay between the MDUSV and AFP and exchange electronic support data. 
The MQ-8, EXT.SN.5, is an unmanned rotary-wing asset launched and controlled 
from the AFP. There may be multiple MQ-8 assigned to the AFP, but the interactions with 
the MDUSV at the context level remain consistent. The MQ-8 and MDUSV exchange 
communications, CEC information, and Common Datalink (CDL) information on a 
bidirectional communication link. While the MQ-8 has operational B/C versions, the more 
robust MQ-8C was simulated. 
The Red forces, EXT.SN.6, are provided to depict all enemy force components. 
The configuration of the Red forces varies depending on location and scenario. Regardless 
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of the Red force configuration, the interaction with the MDUSV remains consistent. The 
MDUSV receives emissions that may be tracked passively. The MDUSV may also perform 
active tracking and receive track reflections from Red forces. Finally, the MDUSV may be 
the target of Red force weapons or countermeasures as a reaction to MDUSV active 
emissions. 
The MDUSV context diagram is completed with Global Positioning System (GPS), 
EXT.SN.7, and Satellite Communications, EXT.SN.8. The GPS provides position and time 
information data to the MDUSV to facilitate navigation and ISR functions. The inclusion 
of this item is not intended to eliminate more jam-resistant navigation inputs. The satellite 
communications entity serves to provide a bidirectional conduit for satellite 
communications information to include CEC and in-situ data; this interaction exists for 
control of the MDUSV, but is not be available per the CONOPS. 
C. OPERATIONAL SITUATIONS 
Operational analysis was next approached through the creation of operational 
situation (OPSIT) threads. These narratives walked through different MDUSV and AFP 
missions and were provided to relevant stakeholders for input and modification. 
Operational activities and flows were then derived from these OPSITs for creation of an 
Operational Activity Decomposition Tree (OV-5a) and other products. Notably, many 
portions of the OPSITs did not directly support the project objectives. Despite being 
relevant to MDUSV and AFP operations, these portions were either discarded for relevance 
or were specifically included to highlight their necessity to the ISR-T mission while being 
outside of the scope of this report. 
D. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A) 
The OV-5a displayed in Figure 8 is a hierarchy of MDUSV activities within the 
OTH-T mission, as derived from the OPSITs. Categorically, it can be divided between 
performing a find/fix/track phase (see OA.3 Perform ISR in Figure 8), supporting the AFP 
engagement, and integrating AFP/MDUSV information through communication. 
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Figure 8.  MDUSV Operational Activities 
The gray box on the left, operational activity (OA) 1 Perform Patrol, may include 
items such as navigating/stationing and other activities associated with seaworthiness and 
executing a transit on the high seas. The gray color is indicative of being out of the scope 
of this research, and an assumption that these activities are required by the mission and are 
being performed, but lack definition in the simulation and are without detailed analysis. 
OA.2, Communicate with AFP, represents all data exchange between the MDUSV 
and the AFP segments exercising C2. This activity pairs with the research objective 
concerning communication methods. This OA is subdivided into two supporting activities: 
Send Data and Receive Data. The Send Data activity captures the need to send MDUSV 
health and position, MDUSV generated surveillance data, and MDUSV integrated fire 
control data that are necessary for performing other activities. Additional detail is shown 
in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Communicate with AFP OA 
The Perform ISR OA, shown in Figure 10, is the high-level activity that captures 
the MDUSV’s ability to collect surveillance information for the AFP. This OA pairs with 
the research objective concerning sensor types and utilization methods. It is subdivided 
into Detect Threats, Correlate Threats, and Track Threats. Detect Threats represents the 
OA responsible for passive or active detection of objects in the MDUSV’s field of regard. 
The Correlate Threats OA performs basic data processing to resolve errors and correlate 
MDUSV tracks against existing CEC objects. Finally, Track Threats is the activity of 
maintaining coverage and updating the changing characteristics of detected tracks. 
 
Figure 10.  Perform ISR OA 
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The final OA is the Support Engagement activity seen in Figure 11. This OA 
provides for MDUSV support of the integrated fire control activities within the AFP. It is 
decomposed as: Provide Fire Control Data, Perform Electronic Attack, and Provide Battle 
Damage Assessment (BDA). The Provide Fire Control Data OA supports the integrated 
fire control operation with dedicated sensor support to engage a designated threat with AFP 
weaponry. This also supports the research objective concerning sensor types and methods. 
Perform Electronic Attack enables the MDUSV EA packages to inhibit the Red 
engagement sequence as well as defend the MDUSV from jammable weapons. This 
supports the research objective concerning the impact of EA capabilities on AFP 
effectiveness. Finally, the Provide Battle Damage Assessment activity utilizes sensor 
information to support OTH-T BDA following engagements and supporting C2 decisions 
to continue engagements. 
 
Figure 11.  Support Engagement OA 
E. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY MODEL (OV-5B) AND EVENT-TRACE 
DESCRIPTION (OV-6C) 
After identifying pertinent MDUSV operational activities, the combined 
Operational Activity Model (OV-5b) and Event-Trace Description (OV-6c), depicted in 
Figure 12, was created to specify the sequencing and associated input and output 
relationships of these activities. The model begins with AFP distributing operational/
navigational orders to the MDUSV. This prompts the MDUSV to perform the patrol and 
start performing ISR. The MDUSV will communicate notable detections and refine threat 
data to send back to the AFP. Once in receipt of the threat data, the AFP will determine if 
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an engagement is warranted. If an engagement is desired, the AFP will send engagement 
support commands to the MDUSV (electronic attack, fire control data) and release a 
weapon. Once the AFP fires the weapon, the MDUSV will aid in conducting a battle 
damage assessment on the enemy. At engagement termination and model conclusion, the 
sequence may recommence for additional targets or revert the MDUSV to performing ISR 
or other patrol activities. 
 
Figure 12.  MDUSV Operational Activity Model (OV-5b) and Event-
Trace Description (OV-6c) 
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VI. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. SYSTEMS FUNCTIONALITY DESCRIPTION (SV-4) 
Following operational analysis, the OV-5a and OV-5b/6c were utilized to transition 
into the functional analysis of an MDUSV capable AFP. Creating a functional hierarchy 
that coincides with Department of Defense Architectural Framework Systems 
Functionality Description (SV-4) not only allowed us to start deriving functional 
requirements from the lowest levels of our hierarchy, but also allowed us to begin 
concentrating and focusing our efforts on the functions and aspects of the MDUSV that 
provide insight into our research questions. The SV-4 is displayed in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  MDUSV Equipped AFP Functional Hierarchy 
Navigate (tracing to the MDUSV Perform Patrol activity) and Organic Air 
Operations functionality are both in gray to signify the requirement or possible requirement 
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for this functionality in the performance of the mission, but that these functions did not 
support project objectives. Navigate includes variance in formation tactics and Organic Air 
Operations consists of the launch, recovery, and support of AFP air assets. Though 
instantiations of each exist within the simulation, these functions are not varied or analyzed 
in a meaningful way.  
The AFP functionality of Sense is relevant to the MDUSV and manned vessels, 
pairing with the Perform ISR activity and research objective concerning sensor 
employment. The sub-functions similarly pair with the sub-activities, but the SV-4 also 
includes a delineation of active and passive functionality. Active refers to sensor 
functionality, such as radar, which emits a signal and subsequently receives a return. 
Passive refers to sensors that function by receiving only (for example, electronic support 
measures [ESM] or an electro-optical or infrared camera). Executing one versus the other 
will impact both the detectability of the MDUSV and the quality of the Sense function. 
C2 Functions encompasses the AFP engagement and management of the 
battlespace. Within Engage functionality, the Surface to Surface Strike functionality is 
associated with the manned AFP vessels, whereas radio frequency (RF) jamming refers to 
the MDUSV and pairs with the EA activity and research objective.  
Similarly, the Self-Defense function is attributable to both the MDUSV and manned 
AFP vessels, but in this research, the Countermeasures Deployment and Weapon [System] 
Jamming connect the simulated MDUSVs with the research objective concerning MDUSV 
countermeasures with overall AFP effectiveness. This functionality refers to defensive 
action by the MDUSV when engaged by Red. 
Last, Communication functionality supports the communications methods research 
objective and the Communicate with the AFP activity. This functionality refers to the 
exchange of information provided by the Sense function and the commands to execute 
applicable portions of C2 Functions. Research in this area focuses heavily on providing 
adequate communications ranges with systems internal to the AFP. The range at which 
sensor information can be exchanged will vary based on the availability of TALONS or an 
airborne relay (and their heights) or the lack of either. While we recognized the importance 
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of EMCON and the difficulty of it in MUM-T, it is assumed for this simulation that the 
MDUSV is in continuous communication with the AFP main body. For this reason, 
EMCON Policy Execution, with regard to communications, is included in the SV-4, but 
will not be a consideration in simulation design. 
B. MEASURES 
Monitoring the performance of the functions and effectiveness of the overall 
configurations is accomplished through measures of performance (MOP) and measures of 
effectiveness (MOE). MOPs were selected to tie directly to previously described functions, 
and are tracked in the simulation for analysis. For example, passive detection functionality 
is measured in the simulation as the range at which the detection occurs. Combinations of 
MOPs contribute to MOEs. While MOPs measure specific component-level performance, 
MOEs track a broader system concept or goal. For example, a variety of sub-functions and 
associated MOPs contribute to the MOE First-to-fire. MOEs are attributable to specific 
project objectives, and the MOP and MOE simulation data informs the analysis section of 
this report. The MOEs and MOPs are described in the following sections: 
1. Measures of Effectiveness 
• MOE 1—First-to-fire: The First-to-fire operational metric depicts the 
effectiveness of the AFP configuration when engaging the enemy force. 
The MOE for first-to-fire is captured at the engagement of a blue or red 
entity. This metric provides who fires first, at what simulation time they 
fire, and when they first fire relative to when the opposing force first fires. 
When Red is engaging Blue, the metric measures strikes against the 
manned AFP vessels, and excludes strikes against forward-based 
MDUSVs. When designating this as an MOE, we anticipated that a peer 
enemy force with a slight advantage would have the lowest time of fire, 
but expect that an AFP augmented with MDUSV would shift this to favor 
Blue. This traces back to project objectives concerning communications 
methods and sensor utilization. 
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• MOE 2—Number of manned AFP assets destroyed: The survivability 
of manned AFP assets is an operational status describing the AFP’s ability 
to survive an engagement. The MOE is the number of AFP manned assets 
destroyed during a simulation run. This MOE examines the MDUSV 
contribution to providing clutter, consuming Red resources that would 
otherwise be directed to manned vessels. The durability of this MDUSV 
clutter will be affected by MDUSV self-defense equipment. This MOE ties 
to our research objective concerning the use of MDUSV onboard 
countermeasures. 
• MOE 3—Weapons expended to destroyed forces ratio: The operational 
lethality of the AFP determines the MDUSV contribution to the 
engagement success of the AFP against enemy forces. This measure 
reflects the addition of engagement support provided by MDUSV, 
including any MDUSV electronic attack functionality. The MOE is 
captured as the number of destroyed enemy vessels at simulation 
conclusion as well as the ratio of those kills to the number of missiles Blue 
expended to achieve them. Like the previous MOE, this measure also 
benefits from the redirection of Red resources away from manned Blue 
vessels. 
2. Measures of Performance and Traceability 
MOPs are depicted in Table 4. These tie directly to functions and MOEs; these 
relationships are shown in the table. 
F.2 Sense ultimately contributes to the First-to-fire MOE. Passive and active sensor 
detection performance is measured by the range at which it occurs in the simulation. 
Considering detections such as the angle of arrival of an emission (with the true location 
being anywhere down that line of bearing), this MOP does not rely on Blue knowing the 
range of the detection when it happens. F.2.3, passive and active tracking functionality, is 
measured as the range at which Blue locates the Red contact. In both of these cases, greater 
range is better performance. F.2.2 Fix refers to the compilation and processing of sensor 
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data. These processes are directly tied to programming we created, rather than the interplay 
of multiple simulation variables; as such, we did not append a corresponding MOP. 
The Engage functionality in F.3.1 traces to the Destroyed Enemy Forces MOE. The 
MOP associated with the RF jamming sub-function measures the number of Red missiles 
launched. Jamming of a Red vessel could degrade its targeting solution and thus the launch 
of offensive and defensive missiles. The Surface-to-Surface Strike function is measured by 
Blue missile hit percentages. For Blue missiles, more is better. For Red, less is better. 
 Tracing to the Number of Manned AFP Assets Destroyed MOE, MDUSV self-
defense performance is measured by the number of MDUSVs destroyed per run. This 
applies to a weapon jamming system functionality. For this MOP, less is better. 
 MDUSV range from the AFP is the MOP attached to “Exchange Sensor 
Information” functionality. Communications range was predicted to be a sizeable limiting 
factor of how far MDUSV pushes ahead of the AFP. This distance directly ties into the 
First-to-fire MOE. 
As described in previous sections, F.1 Navigate and F.6 Organic Air Operations 
are not specifically examined; in Table 4, these rows are shaded light red. 
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Table 4. MOE/MOP Traceability 





F.1 Navigate     
F.1.1 Commanded Navigation     
F.1.2 Autonomous Navigation     
F.2 Sense   
First-to-Fire 
F.2.1 Detect   
F.2.1.1 Passively Detect Passive detection range 
F.2.1.2 Actively Detect Active detection range 
F.2.2 Fix   
F2.2.1 Passively Fix   
F2.2.2 Actively Fix   
F.2.3 Track   
F.2.3.1 Passively Track Passive First Reported Track Range 
F.2.3.2 Actively Track Active First Reported Track Range 
F.3 C2 Functions   
F.3.2 Battle Management   
F.3.1 Engage   
Destroyed 
Enemy Forces 
F.3.1.1 RF Jamming Red Missiles Launched 
F.3.1.2 Surface to Surface 
Strike Blue Missile Hit %  





F.4.1 Countermeasure Deployment 
F.4.2 Weapon [System] Jamming 
F.5 Communication   
First-to-Fire F.5.1 Exchange Sensor 
Information MDUSV Range 
F.5.2 EMCON Policy Execution     
F.6 Organic Air Operations     
F.6.1 Launch/Recover     
F.6.2 Operate     
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VII. SIMULATION DESIGN 
A. AFP AND RED FORCE CONFIGURATION  
The simulation modeled the AFP in a variety of configurations of DDG-51, LCS, 
and MDUSVs as seen in Figure 14 and previously in Figure 1. The Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer (Flight III), which will become the Navy’s newest instantiation of the DDG-51 
class and will incorporate the latest in radar and weapons technologies (Jane’s by IHS 
Markit 2019c), is modeled in the simulation. Jane’s states that a combination of Huntington 
Ingalls and General Dynamics is contracted to build more than ten ships with expected 
commissioning to commence in 2023. A younger program, LCS, is less expensive than a 
destroyer. The simulation instantiates an LCS configured with an anti-surface warfare 
(ASUW) module. The LCS has two different hull types; this effort utilizes the Freedom 
Class type exclusively. As already specified by the capstone tasking, the MDUSV, 
Seahunter, serves as the baseline MDUSV.  
 
Figure 14.  AFP Configuration DDG and LCS within Simulation. 
Adapted from Jane’s by IHS Markit (2019c) and (2019d). 
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The DDG-51 Flight III was configured with an array of anti-ship missiles for this 
experiment. The Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), or AGM-158C is derived from 
the AGM-158B, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile - Extended Range (also known as 
JASSM-ER). The LRASM only requires software modifications from its predecessor to 
enable compatibility with the vertical launch system (VLS) of the DDG-51. The weapon 
employs autonomous evasive routing, a multi-mode sensor/seeker for detection and 
discrimination, and a 454-kilogram (kg) penetrator and blast-fragmentation warhead 
(Jane’s by IHS Markit 2019e). 
Additional cruise missile armament on the DDG-51 is represented by the Block IV 
RGM-109E Tactical Tomahawk or Tomahawk Anti-ship Missile (TASM). The 313kg 
conventional warhead is delivered via GPS and inertial guidance systems. A multi-mode, 
anti-ship missile is in development and is expected to be introduced to the inventory as part 
of the missile mid-life recertification process (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2019h). 
The DDG-51 armament is also armed with the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) / 
Extended Range Active Missile (also known as ERAM). As described by Jane’s by IHS 
Markit, the SM-6 is a multipurpose long-range anti-air warfare, sea-based terminal defense, 
and ASUW missile. For this experiment, the focus was placed on the SM-6 ASUW mission 
utilizing the missile’s inertial guidance with mid-course updates, GPS guidance, and active 
seeker homing modes in the terminal phase. The Jane’s data formed our understanding that, 
at 115kg, the missile uses a smaller warhead than the cruise missile weapons but carries 
significant kinetic energy with terminal velocities in excess of 1000 meters per second 
(Jane’s by IHS Markit 2019g). 
Also, according to Jane’s by IHS Markit, the LCS will be equipped with the 
medium-range, anti-ship missile labeled Naval Strike Missile (NSM). The NSM may be 
incorporated into the current ASUW module on the LCS. The missile provides an OTH-T 
capability for the LCS. The weapon brings a 120kg warhead delivered at high subsonic 
velocities. The NSM is constructed to provide low radar cross-section (RCS) and high-g 
terminal maneuvers as counter-measures to ship defenses (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2019f). 
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This experiment included no conventional weapons onboard the MDUSV. With 
guidance from the stakeholders, the MDUSV was equipped with communications and 
sensor equipment. The TALONS was explored as a means to extend communication and 
sensor range, enhancing the OTH-T capability of the AFP. The MQ-8 Fire Scout was also 
modeled as a communication extension platform. The MDUSV active radar option within 
this experiment represents the AN/SPS-75(V) as described in Jane’s by IHS Markit 
(2018b); it was modeled as a mast-height sensor (no lofting with TALONS). The LCS 
active radar model also utilizes the mast-height AN/SPS-75(V).   
The simulation active radar parameters for the DDG-51 model an AN/SPY-6(V) 
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). This radar will be deployed on the DDG-51 
Flight III, replacing the AN/SPY-1(V) version. The AMDR will provide 360-degree 
coverage for both air, missile, and surface threats. The first delivery to the Navy is expected 
in 2024 (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2019b). 
AFP C2 for DDG-51, LCS, and MDUSV occurred over datalinks such as CDL and 
CEC. The simulation provides no modeling of the datalinks and assumes transmission 
latency is below the resolution of the simulation time increment. Basic ship self-defense 
layers to include missile-based, offensive jamming, countermeasures, and close in 
engagements are modeled at an effects-based fidelity. 
The Red force configuration was based on a conglomeration of Jane’s by IHS 
Markit open-source information on adversarial and friendly systems throughout the world. 
The Red destroyer is modeled on a Type 052D (Luyang III) class destroyer as described in 
Jane’s by IHS Markit (2019j). The Red force sensor suite is modeled on the U.S. Navy’s 
AN/SPY-1(V) as described in Jane’s by IHS Markit (2019a). The Red surface strike missile 
parameters are representative of an exported variant of the 3M-54 (SS-N-27A ‘Sizzler’) 
described in Jane’s by IHS Markit (2018a). Communication and tactical networks are 
presumed to be an effective cooperative engagement capability. 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
Beyond the AFP configuration, five additional variables were identified for 
inclusion in the design of the experiment. Each of the first three variables from Table 5 are 
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binary, having only a high and low value or state. The MDUSV has the capabilities to 
independently deploy countermeasures and use offensive jamming, as well as operate the 
simulated onboard sensors in either a passive or active mode. The number of MDUSVs 
active in the simulation is also an independent variable. Stakeholders indicated system 
design includes a capability to employ multiple MDUSVs simultaneously from a single 
control station. Therefore, the simulation implements integer values from zero, as a 
baseline, to ten operational MDUSVs. 
Antenna height is implemented in increments (see Table 5). The antenna height 
variable spans between an unmodified height of ten meters, representing an estimated 
mounting point on the MDUSV, to the maximum height of three thousand meters enabled 
by an MQ-8. Directly related, as the antenna height becomes larger, so does the maximum 
allowable distance between the MDUSV and manned vessels to maintain data transfer 
reception. 
Table 5. Design of Experiments Factors and Values 
DOE Factor Low High Variable Notes 
MDUSV countermeasures  Unequipped Equipped Binary 
Offensive jamming Unequipped Equipped Binary 
Sensor employment Passive Active Binary 
MDUSV quantity 0 10 11 integer values 
Antenna height (MDUSV) 10 meters 3000 meters Discrete values of: 10, 225, 450, 1500, 2250, and 3000 meters 




0 LCS Three configurations 
 
Last, are the chosen AFP configurations for investigation. The simulation 
implements AFPs composed of one DDG and two LCSs, two DDGs and one LCS, and two 
DDGs. The MDUSV count is randomly varied with each of the ship selections.  
To combine binary, integer range, and continuous variables in one design of 
experiment, a nearly orthogonal balanced design (NOB) developed by Vieira et al. (2013) 
was used. The NOB design aims to test combinations of input variables across the solution 
space as opposed to focusing on the outliers, or high and low values. To process the 
variables a spreadsheet (found at https://my.nps.edu/web/seed/software-downloads) 
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developed by Vieira et al. was used resulting in 512 input sets for the simulation. Then to 
reduce the chance of analyzing dispersion, the 512 runs were repeated 30 times each. The 
output is visually represented in the scatterplot in Figure 15. The goal was to thoroughly 
investigate the variable ranges while driving the correlation away from absolute one, 
towards zero. The correlations are shown in the table contained in Figure 15 and 
demonstrate a max absolute correlation value of 1.95 percent.  We are confident that the 
experiment derived from this design is uncoupled and provides unbiased, useable data. 
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Figure 15.  Design of Experiments Correlation Table and Scatterplot 
C. DERIVED SIMULATION VARIABLES  
While the design of the experiment modifies six variables in permutations that 
efficiently evaluate performance across the range of possibilities, the remainder of the 
simulation inputs serve to configure the entities and control simulation behavior. The 
derived simulation variables are defined and calculated such that the variables describe the 
desired attributes of the entities within the experiment. The derived simulation variables 
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are divided into three organizational categories: entities (i.e., naval ships), weapons, and 
simulation parameters. 
The entities category captures common characteristics among each of the ships that 
impact performance within the simulation. For this experiment, the speed was set at 15 
knots across all entities. The entities category also provides the active and passive radar 
modes max detection range. The max detection range is defined as the radar horizon and 
computational details are provided in Appendix A. The parameters required to complete 
the radar range equation are captured to represent realistic characteristics of the sensor 
platform supporting each entity in the experiment. The detailed computations and 
parameter definition are presented in Appendix A as well. Finally, the weapons load-out 
and total quantities are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6. Platform-Specific Weapons 
AFP Vessel Weapon Range (nm) Inventory 
LCS NSM 108 8 missiles 
DDG 
SM-6 200 
96 VLS cells LRASM 500 
TASM 869 
 
Because it does not require a vertical launch tube, the NSM is a candidate for use 
on the LCS. The NSM is the most limited in range and shipboard inventory with 108 
nautical miles and eight rounds respectively, but it still has the potential to be an effective 
weapon in a surface-to-surface strike. The DDG-51 has an assortment of SM-6, LRASM, 
and modified Tomahawk anti-ship missiles with a total magazine of ninety-six combined 
rounds available. Additional weapon information to include speed, weight, and warhead 
size are captured in the weapons database. Publicly available source references for specific 
platform and weapon information are included in Appendix A. 
The final category of derived variables is the simulation variables category. The 
simulation variables category captures the basic information required to tailor simulation 
logic. Variables include all effectiveness and settings variables which describe ship self-
defense mechanisms. All information describing the statistical probability of detection and 
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scan rates are contained in the category. The base antenna height for the AFP 
communication mechanism and the salvo size of all engagements are parameterized as 
well. Details, methods, and rationale for these variables are captured in Appendix A. 
D. SIMULATION CONSTRUCTION 
To derive meaningful conclusions that provide insight into the project objectives, 
the intent was to model a system of systems architecture around an MDUSV that has been 
outfitted with OTH-T capabilities. The baseline simulation will be of an AFP employing 
the defined CONOPS without the utilization of MDUSV resources. The baseline 
simulation outputs the dependent variables that translate to defined MOEs and MOPs. 
 Figure 16 depicts the simulated implementation of the functional hierarchy 
described in chapter VI. Navigate F.1 is pervasive across all phases of the simulation and 
represented as a parallel activity at the bottom of the figure. The Detection, Fix and Track, 
and Battle Management and Engagement phases are each depicted in the functional block 
flow and correspond to the simulation phases described in the next few paragraphs. The 
functional block flow diagram incorporates the functions and color scheme from Figure 
13. The silver color actions and activities represent simulation architecture required to 
execute the functional hierarchy and are annotated with a "S.X" label. 
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Figure 16.  Simulation Implemented Functional Hierarchy 
The simulation within ExtendSim relies upon built-in database features to manage 
inputs, outputs, controls, and entities in a logical and organized fashion. The simulation 
design parameters referenced in the DOE provides a means to manipulate the simulation 
variation. Additional variations of entities and environments occur through the database 
interface as well, providing a robust simulation model. The simulation includes dynamic 
force positions that simulate motion. The positions are based on assigned direction and 
vessel speed, dynamic MDUSV position relative to the AFP main body (based on 
communication coverage as a function of antenna height), sensor detection (based on 
passive and active RF), multiple surface-to-surface strike weapons with rudimentary battle 
management implementations, and effects-based models of electronic attack in both 
offensive and defensive modes. 
The model is constructed as a discrete event simulation broken into logical phases 
of execution. The entities moving through each discrete event represent both AFP and Red 
force ships. The beginning phase in the model is labeled Initialize Model Entities and is 
presented in Figure 17. While this phase does not directly relate to the functional 
decomposition presented in Chapter VI, but provides necessary initialization of the desired 
AFP and Red force compilation based on database inputs on the left side of the figure. Each 
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entity is populated with appropriate attribute data based on ship type. The emplacement 
logic for the initialization occurs in the equation block and the final position of the entire 
simulation is captured and stored as output in the database via a history block. Once 
complete, the process continues to the detection phase. 
The remaining portions of the model were constructed into discrete phases that 
correspond with the functional decomposition presented in Chapter VI. The Detection 
Phase corresponds with F.2.1 Find/Detect. The first entrance into the detection phase must 
occur through the initialization phase. However, following the initial detection of an entity, 
re-entrance into the detection phase may occur as a result of a false alarm probability, a 
failed firing solution, or a failed missile engagement. These entrances are shown on the left 
side of Figure 18.  
Timing of the detection phase is controlled independently for Blue and Red through 
a scan rate input. Blue entities pass through the top of the phase while Red entities pass 
through the bottom leg. The detection logic occurs within the equation block and 
determines if the entity being examined is detectable by any of the ships of the opposing 
forces and determines how many opposing ships may simultaneously track the entity. 
Simulation randomness for Monte Carlo data collection occurs within the equation block. 
Once a detection occurs, the entity is sent on in the simulation. The MOP, first detection 
range, is captured in the history block at this point.  
The equation block representing Red detection of Blue entities also corresponds to 
F.3.1.1 RF Jamming when the Blue entity is an MDUSV. This function is controlled by 
database inputs. If active, the function provides an effectiveness decrease of Red detection 




Figure 17.  Initialize Model Entities 
 
Figure 18.  Detection Phase
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The Fix Phase and Track Phase, shown in Figure 19, are the next in sequence and 
correspond to F.2.2 Fix and F.2.3 Track functions. The fix function provides a time delay 
to represent the time required for a` radar system to correlate and verify the detection 
information. The time delay has a random number applied to the mean time to introduce 
variability in the simulation. The track phase provides a time delay to represent the time 
required to initiate a track filter and resulting track file. The time delay, as with the fix 
phase, has a random amount applied to a mean to introduce variability. At the end of the 
process, the MOP Final Detection Range is captured utilizing the history block. 
Following each of the fix and track activity blocks, are equation blocks that 
propagate the entities’ movement as a function of elapsed time and entity speed. The 
propagation represents a rudimentary navigation function that would correspond with F.1 
Navigate. This movement is necessary for simulation results but is not evaluated for 
assessment of navigation functions. 
The Battle Management Phase is shown in Figure 20. This phase represents F.3.2 
Battle Management function within the functional hierarchy. The execution is processed 
differently if the entity is an AFP member or an opposing force. Each of the parallel 
execution paths provides a randomized time delay to represent the system display of 
information and the manual decision of an operator to request and receive permission to 
engage a target. The fire solution process is limited to the serial processing of engaged 
entities with a randomized time delay applied. The final time delay represents the time 
required to request permission to fire from the operational authority. 
45 
 
Figure 19.  Fix and Track Phase 
 
Figure 20.  Battle Management Phase
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The firing solution logic occurs within the equation blocks in each of the legs of 
execution. The firing solution evaluates the location of each of the engaging force ships to 
the entity being engaged. The closest ship is selected for engagement, provided munitions 
are available. The munition is selected based on a programmed firing order from database 
inputs. The exception occurs when the engaging ship has only one munition available. 
Once a munition is selected, the function determines the required time of flight to intercept. 
A salvo of missiles (based on database input) is utilized to engage. The firing solution 
assumes a desired simultaneous arrival of salvo munitions, so the time of flight reported is 
the longest time of flight of all of the munitions engaging. The function outputs the total 
flight time and the number of missiles fired to continue on with the simulation process. The 
MOP number of Red/Blue missiles fired is captured for later storage at this point. 
Additionally, the MOP first-to-fire is captured with a history block at the end of the phase. 
The Missile Engage Phase shown in Figure 21 corresponds to F.3.1.2 Surface to 
Surface Strike as well as F.4.1 Countermeasure Deployment. The engagement process 
provides an activity time delay based on the flight time of the engaging salvo. The entity 
position is propagated by the time increment during missile flight. Each missile within the 
salvo is evaluated independently for effect within the equation blocks. Each entity under 
engagement has three layers of defense: countermeasures, defensive missiles, and a close-
in weapon system. The combined effectiveness of the layered defenses is applied to the 
weapon effectiveness from the database. The number of missiles used in defense is 
maintained as a counter within the holding tank external to the equation. The combined 
effectiveness is compared against a random draw to determine if the engaging missile hits 
the entity. 
Provided a successful engagement of the ship by the missile, the damage is assessed 
against the entity. The damage is a random draw and decrements the number of available 
missiles to the entity based on the drawn value. When an entities available missile count is 
depleted (through firing or damage) then the ship is considered “dead.” In addition, the 
MOP number of missiles hit is captured as an output of the engagement process. 
The function F.4.2 Weapon Jamming is also evaluated when the entity type is an 
MDUSV, and the database has enabled this feature. Enabling this feature provides 
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performance information to determine the impact of MDUSV survivability. The results are 
observed through the number of MDUSV destroyed/survived which is captured in the next 
phase. 
The Exit Phase is not correlated to a function within the functional hierarchy. 
Instead, the Exit Phase, shown in Figure 22, provides data capture of the number of 
destroyed forces (both AFP and Red). 
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Figure 21.  Missile Engagement Phase 
 
Figure 22.  Exit Phase
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VIII. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The simulation output database included all of the information necessary to analyze 
the MOEs and corresponding MOPs. This dataset was processed using the statistical 
analysis program JMP, as in Whitcomb and Beery (2016). Microsoft Excel supplemented 
for portions in which robust chart appearance editing would benefit a reader. This chapter 
aims to convey the implications of the various inputs or possible design considerations 
discussed in previous chapters. Within JMP, stepwise regression was used to screen for 
statistical significance of factors.  Subsequently, least squares regression was used to 
develop a detailed meta-model, prediction profilers, and interaction plots. Both the effects 
of individual inputs and the interaction effects are considered but only factors and 
interactions that increased the 𝑅𝑅2 value by at least one percent were included in our 
prediction models. More information on this is available in Appendix B. 
B. FIRST-TO-FIRE  
1. Detection Range MOPs 
Before analyzing the First-to-fire MOE, it is worth reviewing the prerequisite 
functionality of Sense and Communication. The effects of several of the key contributing 
factors to this functionality are depicted in Figure 23. 
This figure includes the simulation means and quartiles of the simulation time it 
took Blue (MDUSVs or manned AFP vessels) to first detect Red minus the time it took 
Red to first detect Blue (MDUSVs or manned AFP vessels). Values below zero on the Y-
axis signal Blue achieved detection first, whereas values above zero indicate Red detected 
Blue first. As all vessels move at fixed, constant speeds across simulation runs, time and 
range can be used as surrogates for each other. The X-axis maps the range of DOE antenna 
height, which has nested variables within it. First, antenna height established the 
communications range between the MDUSVs and the AFP; as possible communications 
ranges increased, the physical range between the MDUSVs and AFP also increased. The 
10-meter antenna represented a mast antenna on the MDUSV. An antenna at 225 and 450-
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meters refers to TALONS employment. 1500-3000-meters was an airborne relay (MQ-8 
or H-60) between the MDUSVs and AFP. Second, the simulation modeled passive ESM 
as compatible with TALONS; at 225 and 450-meters, the ESM was lofted on TALONS. 
At all other antenna heights, the ESM was at 10-meters. Due to weight feasibility 
constraints of the TALONS hardware, the radar was always at 10-meters, regardless of 
antenna height. In summary, the effects of sensor mode, sensor height, and 
communications range on the difference in the first detection are displayed in Figure 23. 
This pairs with the sensor detection range MOPs (Sense functionality) and the MDUSV 
range MOP (Communication functionality). 
 
Figure 23.  Time Difference between Blue and Red Initial Detections 
Active radar on the MDUSV (shown in orange) presents a net benefit to Red. This 
benefit on average increases as MDUSV moves further ahead of the AFP. Despite 
modeling a low MDUSV RCS, the more powerful and higher mounted Red radar finds the 
MDUSV first in nearly all cases. This mean time difference increases with antenna height 
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(communication range) due to MDUSV attrition; when Red finds the MDUSV before 
being detected by it, Red, in some cases, can silently eliminate the MDUSV. After MDUSV 
attrition, the transit distance remaining before the AFP main body comes into contact with 
the Red Force corresponds to distance ahead of the AFP that the MDUSV was operating 
before attrition. This provides the majority explanation of the increasing mean time delta 
with antenna height (communications range), despite an MDUSV radar height constant of 
10-meters. 
MDUSV employment of only passive ESM is more nuanced. Overall, unlike radar, 
every passive ESM mean detection in the simulation favored Blue. When the ESM receiver 
height was at 10-meters (10, 1500, 2250, and 3000-meter antenna height), the favor was 
relatively minor and without statistically significant differences between the means.  
Unlike radar, this indicates a lack of MDUSV attrition before Blue’s initial detection when 
operating passively; this is stable across communication ranges. Changing the ESM 
receiver height from 10 to 225 and 450-meters (lofting on TALONS) provided the greatest 
net detection time advantage to Blue. As the receiver height increases, the passive detection 
range increases as a function of the equation in Appendix A. Due to the passive nature of 
the ESM, the detection time improvements from increased altitude is not dampened by 
increased Red counter-detection range. 
While many of the simulation inputs were not specifically identified as traceable to 
MOPs associated with the First-to-fire MOE, significant interactions warranted an 
investigation into the effects. In Figure 24, the effects of various simulation inputs and 
functionality break down the MOP of Detection Range. Unlike Figure 23, is examined at 
Blue detection range only, omitting the differential between Red and Blue. 
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The Y-axis is the range (in meters) from the AFP main body starting position at which an MDUSV or 
AFP vessel first detects a Red entity. On the X-axes, antenna height varies from 0-3000 meters (0-450m 
is a TALONS-based extension of communications and ESM; 1500-3000m is an airborne relay extension 
of communications only). A sensor mode of 0 corresponds to passive ESM and 1 corresponds to active 
radar. A jamming value of 0 indicates that it was off or not employed; 1 indicates that offensive jamming 
was utilized. #MDUSV corresponds directly with the number of MDUSVs in the simulation (0-10). The 
red numbers on the X-axes provide a readout of where the red crosshairs were set for emphasis. This 
information should be discarded for binary variables. 
Figure 24.  Range at First Red Entity Detected by Blue Prediction 
Profiles 
Of the significant input factors shown in Figure 24, a passive ESM sensor mode 
and active offensive jamming provide the greatest benefits to Blue detection range. 
Additionally, Blue detection range predictably increases with a higher antenna, which 
results in MDUSV operating in the simulation run further ahead of the AFP position. 
Finally, each additional MDUSV increases the average detection range until six MDUSVs 
where the returns reach peak effectiveness.  
2. First-to-Fire MOE 
Initial analysis of MOE 1, the First-to-fire metric, only accounts for manned vessels 
fired upon first (it excludes MDUSV being fired upon). In the data and JMP outputs, “0” 
corresponds to Red firing on Blue first and “1” corresponds to Blue firing on Red first. It 
does not identify which specific vessel was fired upon; it only indicates whether the entity 
was a Red or Blue manned asset. For our output model, the variables with the largest impact 
on variability of the First-to-fire MOE are MDUSV sensor mode (active radar or passive 
ESM), offensive jamming, AFP composition, and MDUSV quantity. A predication profile 
for each input is depicted in Figure 25. 
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On the Y-axis, a value of 1 indicates Red was fired upon first, whereas a value of 0 indicates Blue was 
fired upon first. The X-axes vary in each chart. A sensor mode of 0 corresponds to passive ESM and 1 
corresponds to active radar. A jamming value of 0 indicates that it was off or not employed; 1 indicates 
that offensive jamming was utilized. An AFP makeup value of 1 corresponds to 2 LCS and 1 DDG, a 
value of 2 corresponds to 1 LCS and 2 DDG, and a value of 3 corresponds to 2 DDG only. #MDUSV 
corresponds directly with the number of MDUSVs in the simulation (0-10). The red numbers on the X-
axes provide a readout of where the red crosshairs were set by default or adjusted for emphasis. This 
information should be discarded for binary variables. 
Figure 25.  First Side to Have Manned Assets Fired upon Prediction 
Profiles  
Similar to the Detection Range MOP, the two binary factors (sensor mode and 
offensive jamming) provide the highest value to Blue forces. These benefits are realized 
when the MDUSV is operating passive ESM in lieu of radar and when the MDUSV 
employs the offensive jamming functionality.  
While it was statistically significant, the operational difference that AFP 
configuration made relative to other inputs was not enough to make a definitive 
recommendation as to the effects on which side fired first.  
The last portion of the figure shows the effect that MDUSV quantity has on the 
First-to-fire metric. When analyzing which side was fired upon first, regardless of the 
inclusion of manned vessels only or MDUSV plus manned vessels as eligible targets in the 
metric, results show that the addition of the MDUSV to the scenario improves the 
likelihood of the Blue force to fire first. Additional data output figures are located in 
Appendix C. From zero to six MDUSVs, each vessel added has diminishing returns, 
maximizing effectiveness at six. We expect that the diminishing returns of effectiveness 
may be a result of limited formation modeling and a lack of course and speed changes in 
response to simulation events. A higher-fidelity version, for example, could include an 
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MDUSV initially outside of sensor range maneuvering into sensor range after another 
vessel detects Red. 
C. AFP SURVIVABILITY 
1. MDUSVs Destroyed MOP 
AFP survivability can be broken down between the survivability of the AFP 
manned vessels (MOE) and the survivability of the MDUSV (MOP). With a hypothesis 
stating that MDUSVs of certain configurations contribute to the further success of the 
manned vessels, it follows that reducing the vulnerability of the MDUSV should improve 
the success of the manned component. The simulation incorporated an optional 
countermeasures system on MDUSV to reduce vulnerability, serving in the role of a 
terminal weapons jamming system. When enabled, the system reduced the probability of a 
Red hit against MDUSV by 15%.  
Figures 26 and 27 depict the number of MDUSVs destroyed during simulation runs 
with the countermeasures off and on. Figure 26 does not consider the number of MDUSVs 
initialized in the simulation, whereas Figure 27 divides the data into separate categories (1-
10 initial MDUSVs). In both cases, there is no statistically significant difference between 
MDUSV survivability and the employment of countermeasures. 
It is likely that the countermeasures performed in accordance with our planned 
implementation of countermeasure effectiveness resulting in a fixed 15% reduction in the 
probability of surface strike hits. However, repeated targeting from Red still led to MDUSV 
attrition. At a higher countermeasure effectiveness value, the statistical significance would 
likely have emerged, but variation in that value was not conducted in this research. Given 
the fixed countermeasure effectiveness coupled with the salvo surface strike approach in 
this experiment, results demonstrate no difference in the mean number of MDUSVs killed 
with and without onboard countermeasures. 
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Figure 26.  MDUSV Survivability with Self-defense Equipment 
 
Figure 27.  MDUSV Survivability by Initialized MDUSV Quantity 
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2. AFP Survivability MOE 
Determining the effects that different variations and combinations of MDUSV 
integration have on MOE 2, AFP Survivability, required the analysis of the AFP manned 
vessels killed output from the simulation runs. Of the six DOE inputs, five are statistically 
significant. These include antenna height, passive/active sensor mode, offensive jamming, 
AFP makeup, and MDUSV quantity. The responses for each are displayed in Figure 28. 
 
The Y-axis is the number of manned AFP vessels killed. The X-axes vary in each chart. The antenna height 
varies from 0-3000 meters (0-450m is a TALONS-based extension of communications and ESM; 1500-
3000m is an airborne relay extension of communications only). A sensor mode of 0 corresponds to passive 
ESM and 1 corresponds to active radar. A jamming value of 0 indicates that it was off or not employed; 1 
indicates that offensive jamming was utilized. An AFP makeup value of 1 corresponds to 2 LCS and 1 DDG, 
a value of 2 corresponds to 1 LCS and 2 DDG, and a value of 3 corresponds to 2 DDG only. #MDUSV 
corresponds directly with the number of MDUSVs in the simulation (0-10). The red numbers on the X-axes 
provide a readout of where the red crosshairs were set by default or adjusted for emphasis. This information 
should be discarded for binary variables. 
Figure 28.   AFP Survivability Prediction Profiles 
Provided that this metric is concerned with the durability of AFP manned ships, it 
is unsurprising that the AFP composition or makeup is the most influential input. Although 
this is not a research question we set out to directly address, our output shows that the 
inclusion of LCS in this type of engagement decreases AFP manned asset survivability. 
The fewest AFP ship losses paired with a composition of two DDGs only. This may be 
because the two other possible AFP compositions include LCS and a total of three ships 
vice two. In this view, there are more manned assets to target in total if LCS is at all present. 
This is tempered, however, by a configuration of two DDGs and one LCS surviving more 
frequently than a configuration of one DDG and two LCS.  
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The next most influential input was sensor mode. These results are consistent with 
our outputs from the First-to-fire MOE in that MDUSV operating only a passive ESM 
receiver provided the highest level of survivability to the AFP. As seen in Figure 23, 
passive ESM utilization led to either a slight or major advantage over Red in first detection 
time (as opposed to the detriment of active radar). The advantage of first detection and first 
firings leads to greater overall survivability for AFP manned vessels.  
Also consistent with MOE 1, offensive jamming input analysis shows that an 
MDUSV equipped with offensive jamming will help the AFP survivability. Further, the 
offensive jamming is most effective when coupled with an active sensor configuration 
(radar) versus a passive sensor (ESM). The interaction between sensor mode and jamming 
is shown in Figure 29. 
 
The Y-axis is the number of manned AFP vessels killed. On the X-axes, a sensor mode of 
0 corresponds to passive ESM and 1 corresponds to active radar. A jamming value of 0 
indicates that it was off or not employed; 1 indicates that offensive jamming was utilized. 
An AFP makeup value of 1 corresponds to 2 LCS and 1 DDG, a value of 2 corresponds to 
1 LCS and 2 DDG, and a value of 3 corresponds to 2 DDG only.  
Figure 29.  AFP Survivability Interaction Profiles  
The effect that different numbers of MDUSV have on the manned AFP 
survivability responds in a linear fashion; the more MDUSV that are in the conflict, the 
less AFP manned assets are killed. We hypothesize that the MDUSV adds both lethality to 
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the AFP (by providing emergent capabilities) as well as additional clutter to the battlespace 
(causing Red forces to fire on MDUSVs instead of the manned AFP).  
The last significant factor for this MOE is antenna height. While it is the least 
influential of the significant factors, the results opposed our hypothesis. It seemed logical 
that increased communications ranges (MDUSV further ahead of the AFP) and increased 
sensor ranges (earlier detection) would increase the number of Red killed while reducing 
the number of Blue killed. The data shows the opposite is true for this simulation. This is 
likely due to two factors. Most importantly, increasing the communications and sensor 
ranges quickly eclipses the weapons range of the LCS’ NSM, thus eliminating it as a 
shooter. Second, with increasing weapons fly out times resulting from extended MDUSV 
operating ranges, Red benefits from added time to eliminate the MDUSV providing the 
targeting information for subsequent missile launches. 
Overall, AFP survivability relies much more on AFP makeup and the use of 
jamming, RF configuration, and MDUSV employment depicted in the Pareto diagram in 
Figure 30. This figure shows that antenna height has almost three times less of an effect on 
manned asset survivability than sensor mode. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Pareto Diagram of Significant Factors for AFP 
Survivability 
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D. DESTROYED ENEMY FORCES 
1. Red Missiles Launched MOP 
The MOP of Red Missiles Launched ties to the RF Jamming functionality. This 
offensive jamming performed by MDUSV was intended to degrade Red’s firing solution 
and was implemented as a degradation on Red’s detection of Blue. It was hypothesized 
that with jamming enabled, Red would launch fewer total missiles because of the 
degradation. This hypothesis is supported by the information in Figure 31.  
 
Figure 31.  Offensive Jamming and Red Missile Launches 
With statistically significant differences in the means of the simulation data, the 
offensive jammer, as implemented, reduced the number of missiles launched, on average, 
from 34.2 to 28.4 (a reduction of approximately 17%). Logically following this, Blue 
missile launch numbers also improved with the jammer on. This indicates that with fewer 
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Red missile launches, Blue vessel attrition was more limited, resulting in Blue missile 
launches that otherwise would not have occurred. 
2. Weapons Expended to Destroyed Forces Ratio MOE 
Our final MOE, Weapons Expended to Destroyed Forces Ratio, relies on two 
outputs to define a ratio of Blue missiles fired per Red vessel killed and broadens the 
perspective beyond the MOP of Red missile launches. We looked at both outputs 
individually before analyzing their combination. Starting with the Blue missiles fired, the 
results identify the same significant factors as AFP survivability. The number of Blue 
missiles fired is highest with a low antenna height, passive sensor mode, offensive 
jamming, AFP makeup of two LCS, one DDG, and five MDUSVs in the battlespace, as 
shown in Figure 32. 
 
The Y-axis is the number of missiles fired from Blue AFP vessels. The X-axes vary in each chart. The 
antenna height varies from 0-3000 meters (0-450m is a TALONS-based extension of communications and 
ESM; 1500-3000m is an airborne relay extension of communications only). A sensor mode of 0 
corresponds to passive ESM and 1 corresponds to active radar. A jamming value of 0 indicates that it was 
off or not employed; 1 indicates that offensive jamming was utilized. An AFP makeup value of 1 
corresponds to 2 LCS and 1 DDG, a value of 2 corresponds to 1 LCS and 2 DDG, and a value of 3 
corresponds to 2 DDG only. #MDUSV corresponds directly with the number of MDUSVs in the simulation 
(0-10). The red numbers on the X-axes provide a readout of where the red crosshairs were set by default 
or adjusted for emphasis. This information should be discarded for binary variables. 
Figure 32.  Blue Missiles Fired Significant Factor Prediction Profiles 
Strictly analyzing how many Blue missiles are fired provides limited insight into 
our research questions. It does not specify any information about which vessels, Red or 
Blue, were eliminated based on the number of rounds fired and the lack of outcome 
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information limited us from drawing conclusions. The information concerning Red vessels 
killed does provide some standalone insights. Sensor mode, offensive jamming, AFP 
make-up, and MDUSV quantity are the significant inputs for our Red killed prediction 
equation. Results for the highest amount of Red killed are the inverse of the results for the 
amount of Blue killed (AFP survivability). The relationships to Red killed are shown in 
Figure 33.  
 
The Y-axis is the number of Red vessels killed (0-3). On the X-axes, antenna height varies from 
0-3000 meters (0-450m is a TALONS-based extension of communications and ESM; 1500-
3000m is an airborne relay extension of communications only). A sensor mode of 0 corresponds 
to passive ESM and 1 corresponds to active radar. A jamming value of 0 indicates that it was 
off or not employed; 1 indicates that offensive jamming was utilized. An AFP makeup value of 
1 corresponds to 2 LCS and 1 DDG, a value of 2 corresponds to 1 LCS and 2 DDG, and a value 
of 3 corresponds to 2 DDG only. #MDUSV corresponds directly with the number of MDUSVs 
in the simulation (0-10). The red numbers on the X-axes provide a readout of where the red 
crosshairs were set for emphasis. This information should be discarded for binary variables. 
Figure 33.  Red Killed Significant Factor Prediction Profiles 
This relationship supports our results and expectations that as Blue survivability 
peaks, so does its lethality. Moving on to our 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 ÷ 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 𝐾𝐾𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 MOE, 
only antenna height, sensor mode, and AFP make-up remain significant but none provide 
operationally significant information well enough defined for us to make a 
recommendation. In Figure 34, the slope of the response lines are near horizontal signifying 




The Y-axis is the number of missiles fired by Blue AFP divided by the number of Red vessels 
killed. On the X-axes, antenna height varies from 0-3000 meters (0-450m is a TALONS-based 
extension of communications and ESM; 1500-3000m is an airborne relay extension of 
communications only). A sensor mode of 0 corresponds to passive ESM and 1 corresponds to 
active radar. An AFP makeup value of 1 corresponds to 2 LCS and 1 DDG, a value of 2 
corresponds to 1 LCS and 2 DDG, and a value of 3 corresponds to 2 DDG only. The red numbers 
on the X-axes provide a readout of where the red crosshairs were set by default or adjusted for 
emphasis. This information should be discarded for binary variables. 
Figure 34.  Blue Missiles Fired/Red Killed Significant Factor 
Prediction Profiles 
E. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Our analysis examined significant variables with respect to the stated MOPs and 
MOEs. Table 7, a summary of these findings, shows the MOE titles, the associated 
measures, and a listing of the significant input variables. The far-right column depicts the 
most desirable state of the variables for AFP effectiveness. Notably, sensor configuration 
is significant for each metric whereas defensive countermeasures do not reflect significance 
in any analyzed variable. The remaining variables were significant in some of the areas. 
When applied across the original project objectives, the analysis in this chapter enables the 
conclusions in the next chapter.  
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Table 7. Analysis Summary 
MOE Metric Significant Variables 
   Operational 
   Effectiveness 
   Maximum 
First-to-fire 
Detection Range & Time 
MDUSV Antenna Height 3000 meters 
Passive/Active Sensor Passive 
Offensive Jamming Enabled 
Number of MDUSVs Six MDUSVs 
First-to-fire on Manned 
Target 
Passive/Active Sensor Passive 
Offensive Jamming Enabled 
AFP Makeup Indeterminate 
Number of MDUSVs Six MDUSVs 
AFP Survivability AFP Manned Entities Killed 
MDUSV Antenna Height 10 meters 
Passive/Active Sensor Passive 
Offensive Jamming Enabled 
AFP Makeup Two DDGs 










Number of MDUSVs 
Destroyed Enemy Forces 
(Red Killed) 
Passive/Active Sensor Passive 
Offensive Jamming Enabled 
AFP Makeup Two DDGs 




MDUSV Antenna Height 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS ORGANIZATION 
Recall that the five objectives of this research on using MDUSV(s) to support an 
AFP OTH-T surface strike are to:  
1. Determine the communications methods that best support effective OTH 
operation of the MDUSV.  
2. Determine effective sensor types and utilization methods to best support 
detection and engagement in an OTH scenario.  
3. Understand enhancements to AFP effectiveness through the utilization of 
electronic attack (EA) capabilities on the MDUSV.  
4. Explore EMCON tactics and implications on detection and engagement 
support to the AFP.  
5. Understand impacts to AFP effectiveness when MDUSV is equipped with 
on-board defensive countermeasures.  
Accordingly, this chapter presents five sections that summarize the major findings 
in each of these areas as well as additional insights that emerged in pursuit of the project 
objectives. This chapter closes with recommendations for future work. 
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
1. Communication Methods 
Our investigation of communications methods utilized feasible solutions for 
increasing communications ranges beyond mast-to-mast LOS without the use of SATCOM 
and within the confines of low-fidelity RF propagation modeling. This included employing 
TALONS on the MDUSV, which was capped at 450-meters in elevation. We did not 
incorporate any limitations that may be likely encountered when towing an airborne array 
(fuel and speed degradations, required vessel course relative to the true winds, et cetera). 
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The other communication method was an aircraft launched from an AFP vessel serving as 
an airborne relay. This altitude ranged from 1500 to 3000 meters. While this relay was 
frequently referred to as an MQ-8 Firescout, a similarly outfitted H-60 could also act in the 
same role but with potentially different endurance considerations. 
It was hypothesized that because larger communications ranges allow the MDUSV 
to push further ahead of the AFP, a first detection of the enemy by MDUSV would occur 
with a buffer distance from the AFP main body, allowing the manned component to target 
the enemy from a position of relative safety. This was intended to correspond to the First-
to-fire MOE. 
The hypothesis was correct with regard to the first detection in some cases. 
Modeled for feasibility, the MDUSV radar was substantially lower in power and range than 
the Red radar. Because of this, an active sensor on MDUSV frequently led to MDUSV’s 
attrition before detecting Red, nullifying any modeled benefit of the increased 
displacement from the AFP. In a real-world application, it is reasonable to believe the AFP 
would receive a minor benefit from the knowledge of where MDUSV was when it was 
eliminated by Red, but this was not included in our simulation. When the MDUSV utilized 
passive ESM in lieu of radar, the attrition before detection problem was eliminated. In these 
cases, Blue often detected Red first and did so at ranges corresponding to the 
communication method. 
Extended communication ranges, however, did not significantly affect the First-to-
fire MOE. Further, added ranges did not reduce AFP vessel attrition or increase the sinking 
of Red vessels as hypothesized. The primary reason for this is the interaction with the AFP 
vessel compositions in the simulation. While the ranges of the weapons paired with the 
DDGs exceeded most communications ranges, the NSM associated with LCS quickly fell 
short of the operating ranges effectively turning the DDG into the only viable shooter. As 
a lesser effect, the modeled fly out times of missiles increased with the increased 
displacement of the MDUSV from the AFP. This allowed more opportunities for Red to 
eliminate the MDUSV targeting platform before the arrival of engaging missiles.  
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Flexibility with communications ranges is certainly desirable. Under certain 
conditions, longer communications ranges allow the MDUSV to gain the first detection 
outside of the range of enemy weapons. Future designs and doctrine concerning the 
employment of extended communications ranges should give particular attention to 
balancing the benefit of early knowledge with the cost of exceeding the range of certain 
weapons in the inventory. 
2. Sensor Types 
We examined the use of a surface-search radar and passive ESM system on 
MDUSV in this research. As modeled, the MDUSV was able to use only one or the other. 
Operationally, the third, unexamined option of employing both simultaneously is both 
likely to occur and may provide differing results. Additionally, an operational ESM 
implementation without the use of other sensors would rely on a continuously radiating 
enemy, which may not reflect an opposing forces’ response to DMO.  
As stated in communications methods conclusion, sensor mode was very 
significant in time differences between Red and Blue first detections. The MDUSV active 
radar configuration was cripplingly outperformed by Red’s radars. Conversely, the passive 
ESM system provided Blue with a slight detection advantage over the Red force. This 
detection advantage was greatly improved when the ESM was lofted via TALONS. While 
the First-to-Fire MOE was greatly improved through the use of ESM and was explicitly 
tied to this research area, the benefits of it were very significant in the AFP Survivability 
and Destroyed Enemy Forces MOEs as well. 
High-power radars are likely unfeasible on a medium-displacement craft. Because 
of this, the employment of radar in a high-threat, distributed environment should be 
curtailed where feasible. Given the benefits for Blue throughout the simulation, MDUSVs 
should incorporate robust ESM systems. The systems reduce the susceptibility of the 
MDUSV and greatly contribute to the effectiveness of the AFP. The weight of a feasible 
ESM system was considered when pairing with TALONS but did not include an estimate 
of the weight of the cabling. If the total weight of an ESM system is compatible with 
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TALONS, the added altitude results in desirable detection ranges more commonly found 
in low flying aircraft. 
3. Electronic Attack 
The third research objective was to understand the enhancements to AFP 
effectiveness through the utilization of electronic attack (EA) capabilities on the MDUSV. 
In the simulation, when in range of the Red vessels, an offensive jammer degraded Red’s 
ability to detect Blue. In a higher fidelity simulation, this degradation could also be applied 
to confuse the firing solution of the enemy’s offensive and defensive weapons.  
At a top-level view, more enemies are destroyed when the offensive jammer is 
employed on the MDUSVs. Use of an offensive jammer improves the Destroyed Enemy 
Forces MOE, however, it is important to note that EA has less significance in overall AFP 
effectiveness than the sensor mode. When passive ESM is in use, offensive jamming is not 
operationally significant when measuring Red forces destroyed. It is significant when 
active RF (radar) is operated by MDUSV. This distinction is made clear in the comparison 
of Figures 35 and 36. With ESM operating, the slope of the offensive jamming line between 
engaged and not engaged is near horizontal (no effect) in comparison to the slope of the 




The Y-axis indicates the number of Red vessels destroyed. The X-axes vary in each chart. A 
sensor mode of 0 corresponds to passive ESM and 1 corresponds to active radar. A jamming 
value of 0 indicates that it was off or not employed; 1 indicates that offensive jamming was 
utilized. An AFP makeup value of 1 corresponds to 2 LCS and 1 DDG, a value of 2 corresponds 
to 1 LCS and 2 DDG, and a value of 3 corresponds to 2 DDG only. #MDUSV corresponds 
directly with the number of MDUSVs in the simulation (0-10). The red numbers on the X-axes 
provide a readout of where the red crosshairs were set by default or adjusted for emphasis. This 
information should be discarded for binary variables. 
Figure 35.  Red Killed Significant Factor Prediction Profiles: 
Passive ESM 
 
The Y-axis indicates the number of Red vessels destroyed. The X-axes vary in each chart. A 
sensor mode of 0 corresponds to passive ESM and 1 corresponds to active radar. A jamming 
value of 0 indicates that it was off or not employed; 1 indicates that offensive jamming was 
utilized. An AFP makeup value of 1 corresponds to 2 LCS and 1 DDG, a value of 2 corresponds 
to 1 LCS and 2 DDG, and a value of 3 corresponds to 2 DDG only. #MDUSV corresponds 
directly with the number of MDUSVs in the simulation (0-10). The red numbers on the X-axes 
provide a readout of where the red crosshairs were set by default or adjusted for emphasis. This 
information should be discarded for binary variables. 




4. EMCON Policy 
We initially intended to research different EMCON methods and effects, but 
ultimately limited it to active and passive sensor research and identifying possible 
communication networks for use. This decision was made with an understanding of the 
importance of EMCON in naval threat environments and the difficulty of it with unmanned 
platforms. Adequately researching this topic would require a narrower, more dedicated 
scope than the work performed here. 
5. Countermeasures 
Our final explored research objective aimed to understand the impacts on AFP 
effectiveness when MDUSVs are equipped with on-board defensive countermeasures. This 
was hypothesized to reduce the vulnerability of the MDUSV, thus increasing the sensor 
time in contact with Red. This would allow Blue time to continue firing with valid track 
information and direct Red fire away from AFP vessels with persisting MDUSV clutter. In 
the simulation, this was implemented as a 15% reduction in Red missile probability of hit 
against MDUSV. 
Stepwise regression of defensive countermeasures was not significant in any of our 
developed models, including the response model of MDUSV killed (available in Appendix 
D). The degradation the countermeasures imposed on Red missiles was not varied; it is 
likely that a higher value, even if the value is not achievable, would show a statistically 
significant improvement to the AFP Survivability MOE. As implemented in our simulation, 
the countermeasures provided no measurable value to the MDUSV defense. 
6. AFP Composition 
While not a stated research objective, AFP configuration was often the largest 
impact on our measures. Open-source information was utilized to model DDG-51 Flight 
III and LCS-1, with an aim to ensure our MDUSV results could be applied to both vessels. 
Through the modeling and simulation of these ships, we developed some further insights 
from the analysis of our output. The AFP configurations with two DDGs (and an optional 
LCS) overall performed much better than the configuration with two LCS and one DDG. 
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DDGs seemed to be better suited for our engagement based on their larger variety of 
weapons available and associated magazine depth. 
We also developed a conclusion for the ideal number of MDUSV employed as 
OTH-T assets to an AFP. Returns for effectiveness peak for the First-to-fire MOE, 
detection range, detection time, and Blue missiles fired at six MDUSVs. We expect that 
this value is strongly influenced by the head-on navigation of Red and Blue vessels in the 
simulation (no variation in crossing-angle) and a lack of MDUSV navigation changes in 
response to enemy detections by other MDUSVs. More information is available in 
Appendix E. 
C. FUTURE STUDY OPPORTUNITIES 
Research in this capstone builds upon previously examined MDUSV and DMO 
topics and contributes valuable simulation data to inform/guide potential decision-makers. 
Throughout the capstone process, it was necessary to make broad assumptions or feasibility 
decisions to properly scope down the potential solution-space to a framework that could be 
appropriately simulated. The following list below depicts topics that were identified as 
pivotal to the overall evaluation of MDUSV employment yet were not captured in detail 
through the research. 
1. EMCON Policy 
Naval MUM-T operations enable autonomous vehicles to penetrate high-threat 
areas while permitting operators to remain relatively safer at an increased standoff distance. 
This advantageous protection of human life, however, may be offset by tactical 
degradations associated with continuous electromagnetic emissions between operator and 
platform. Our research explored various ways MDUSV inclusion in an AFP could enhance 
mission effectiveness, but we recognize its presence may also pose negative aspects worthy 
of further research. 
2. SATCOM Utilization 
Our research assumes that all MDUSV-collected targeting data will be transmitted 
either directly or through an organic AFP asset. Should the ability to relay target-quality 
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data via satellite communications become technologically feasible, the MDUSV CONOPS 
would require ground-up reconsideration. MDUSV employment factors such as 
formations, search patterns, and number of MDUSVs would be greatly affected by such a 
significant increase in sensor-to-shooter range. 
3. Battle Management / Fire Control Evolution 
The simulated fire control logic selects an engaging ship based only on closest 
geometry between the engaging ship and the engaged ship. If the selected ship is loaded 
with multiple weapons, then simulation variables control firing order. Given the reduced 
AFP effectiveness when formations include the LCS, additional research should be 
performed to determine if the fire control implementation could have exacerbated the LCS 
poor contributions to AFP performance. Beyond fire control and AFP interactions, weapon 
selection should be investigated to determine the impact of weapon appropriate trade-space 
between weapon velocity and warhead kinetic energy. 
4. Quality of Service Modeling 
The sensor fix and track phases modeling were implemented as simple time delays. 
The quality of service metric for sensor tracking was only considered when multiple 
sensors were tracking the same target. Multiple tracking sensors provided a "bonus" to 
missile effectiveness. Investigation opportunities exist in improved modeling of sensor 
platform quality of service and the coupling with weapon effectiveness modeling. 
5. Advanced Engagement Geometries 
Current scenario implementation provides for all Blue on Red engagements to 
begin with no cross-range offset and proceed with a zero-degree crossing angle. The robust 
simulation architecture supports initial cross-range offsets and could support non-zero 
degree crossing angle progressions with minor modifications. The addition of cross-range 




APPENDIX A.  DERIVED VARIABLE DEFINITION 
The passive and active radar detection ranges are used as first-order checks to 
determine if an opponent vessel will be detected by the engaging vessel’s current sensor 
mode. The active and passive radar detection ranges are computed as a function of the radar 
horizon given the simulation is focused on surface ship detection. The following formulas 












Adapted from Department of the Navy (2013) 
Where the following definitions apply: 
• R = theoretical radar range  
• HR = height of the radar 
• HT = height of the target 
• E = theoretical ESM range 
• HS = height of the source emission 
• HE = height of the receiver  
The equations present ranges in nautical miles with height inputs in feet. The simulation 
accepts inputs in metric units, so the equation inputs and outputs are implemented in meters 
resulting in kilometer output. The specific horizon ranges in meters for the DDG-51, Red 
DDG, LCS are captured in Table 8. The antenna heights used for each are included in the 
table as well. For simplicity, the opposing antenna height is assumed to be 17 meters 
constant. The MDUSV active radar is captured in Table 8 as well, but the passive radar 
horizon is a function of MDUSV antenna height and is computed dynamically within the 
simulation. 
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Table 8. Calculated Sensor Ranges 
Ship Radar Height (meters) 
Radar Horizon 
(kilometers) 




DDG-51 17 33.989 17 41.628 
Red DDG 17 33.989 17 41.628 
LCS 20 35.428 20 43.390 
MDUSV 5.5 26.661 Dynamic Dynamic 
 
The simulation utilizes minimum range when comparing the detection horizons and 
the radar range equation range max as a function of desired detection RCS. In order to 
implement this functionality, the sensor information was derived based on open source 
information obtained from Jane’s by IHS Markit AN/SPY-6(V) Air and Missile Defense 
Radar (AMDR) (2019b), AN/SPY-1 (2019a), TRS-3D (AN/SPS-75) (2018b), and TRS-
4D (2019i) entries. Additional estimates of SPY-6 predicted performance included 
detection of half the SPY-1 RCS at double the range (Hempel 2017). The radar range 







= ⋅ ⋅ λ   
Adapted from Özdemiir (2012) 
Where the following definitions apply: 
• Pin = peak transmit power in watts 
• Pmin = minimum detectable signal in watts 
• σ = RCS in meters squared 
• A = antenna area in meters squared 
• λ = frequency wavelength in meters 
Computations parameters were used to determine “clear air” detectability. As an 
example, the AN/SPY-1D(V) is has a documented detection range of 165KM on a 0.0025 
m2 target. The band of operation is estimated at 3.1GHz for S-band (Jane’s by IHS Markit 
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2019b). Using 6MW of peak transmit power, a minimum detectable signal of 4.4e-14 
(-133.57 dBW) is required for an appropriate detection range. Based on experience, 
-133.57 dBW of sensitivity in a non-clutter environment would be reasonable. 
Furthermore, it can also be reasonably concluded that observability in a cluttered 
environment may be reduced to -77 dBW. The complete list of computation parameters 
and resulting use parameters are provided in Table 9 and 10. 
Table 9. Parameters for Computation 
Parameter DDG-51 LCS Type-52 MDUSV 
Peak Power 30000000 3000 6000000 3000 
Area 15.9964 6.14532 16 6.14532 
RCS 0.00125 0.5 0.0025 0.5 
S Min 6.90E-15 1.00E-14 4.40E-14 1.00E-14 
Frequency 3.10E+09 6.00E+09 3.10E+09 6.00E+09 
Range Max 330000 100000 165000 100000 
 
Table 10. Sub-clutter Visibility Estimates 
Parameter DDG-51 LCS Type-52 MDUSV 
Peak Power 30000000 3000 6000000 3000 
Antenna Area 15.9964 6.14532 16 6.14532 
Minimum Signal 1.60E-08 1.00E-11 1.00E-07 1.00E-11 
Frequency 3.10E+09 6.00E+09 3.10E+09 6.00E+09 
 
Chapter IV, Section 3, stated that the complement of weapons in an AFP were 
divided amongst 96 VLS cells. This number is consistent with Jane’s documentation of the 
DDG-51 Flight III ship. The specific allocation of weapons to the DDG-51 is documented 
in Table 11. As well, the Red force DDG is modeled with 64 VLS cells, and the distribution 
of Red anti-ship missiles appears in Table 11. As stated previously, eight NSM are assigned 
to an on-deck launcher for the LCS. The DDG-R allocates 32 of the 64 VLS cells to self-
defense missiles while the DDG-51 allocates 34 of the 96 VLS cells to self-defense 
missions. For modeling simplicity, the LCS receives 34 self-defense missiles even though 
a realistic ship configuration will not contain VLS self-defense missiles.  
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Table 11. Weapon Inventories by Vessel Type 
Weapon/Launcher DDG-R DDG-51 LCS MDUSV 
VLS Cells 64 96 8* 0 
RASM 32 0 0 0 
NSM 0 0 8 0 
SM-6 0 50 0 0 
LRASM 0 10 0 0 
TASM 0 2 0 0 
Self-Defense Missiles 32 34 34* 0 
 
The ship self-defense capability variables are controlled in the simulation 
parameters database. The number of CWIS self-defense systems is modeled at one. The 
effectiveness of a CWIS system is set at 0.30 while the effectiveness of self-defense 
missiles is set at 0.50. The countermeasures effectiveness is set to 0.15. All effectiveness 
numbers are set by engineering judgment given the lack of publicly available information. 
The MDUSV offensive jamming effectiveness is set to 0.25. This parameter is 
utilized when the DOE parameter for MDUSV offensive jamming is set to a value of one. 
The parameter then provides a reduction of detection range available to the Red DDG 
attempting to detect the MDUSV. 
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APPENDIX B.  PREDICTION EXPRESSIONS 
Each output has an associated prediction expression that drives all response figures. 
These are shown in Figures 37 through 44 in the order of appearance in the text.  
 
Figure 37.  First-to-Fire Prediction Equation (Manned Only) 
 
Figure 38.  First-to-Fire Prediction Equation (All Vessels) 
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Figure 39.  Range of First Detection of Red Equation 
 
Figure 40.  Range of First Detection of Blue Equation 
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Figure 41.  AFP Killed Equation 
 
Figure 42.  Blue Missiles Fired Equation 
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Figure 43.  Red Killed Equation 
 
Figure 44.  Blue Missiles Divided by Red Killed Equation 
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APPENDIX C.  FIRST-TO-FIRE AMPLIFYING FIGURES  
The individual factor prediction profiler for the first time a Red entity is detected 
by Blue forces is shown in Figure 45. 
 
Figure 45.  First Blue Detection Prediction Profiler 
The profiler shown in Figure 46 depicts the first side fired upon (1=Red, 0=Blue) 
when targeting MDUSVs is included in First-to-Fire.  
 
Figure 46.  First-to-Fire Prediction Profiler with MDUSV 
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APPENDIX D.  MDUSV KILLED EFFECTS SUMMARY 
A summary of the effects of different inputs on the number of MDUSV killed is 
displayed in Figure 47. Significant factor parameter estimates for simulation response are 
depicted in Figure 48. 
 
Figure 47.  MDUSV Killed Effect Summary 
 
Figure 48.  MDUSV Killed Parameter Estimates 
84 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
85 
APPENDIX E.  MDUSV QUANTITY CONTOUR PROFILES 
Figure 49 contains contour profiles with the number of MDUSVs and detection 
range, detection time, first side fired upon, and Blue missiles fired metrics. Blue’s 
advantage peaks near six MDUSVs across these metrics.  
 
Figure 49.  MDUSV Quantity Contour Profiles 
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